CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ABORTION-A REGULATION REQUIRING A WOMAN To NOTIFY HER HUSBAND BEFORE RECEIVING

AN ABORTION IS IMPERMISSIBLE BECAUSE IT UNDULY BURDENS THE WOMAN'S ABORTION RIGHT-Planned Parenthood v.

Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992).
The topic of abortion has long been a point of contention
between the Supreme Court of the United States and the state
legislatures.' With the landmark decision in Roe v. Wade,2 the
Court removed much of the legislative power in the abortion
context by assuming the role of ajudicial legislature.3 The Court
reverted to a more conservative role with regard to abortion regulations in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,4 transferring
much of the power to regulate abortion back to the state legislatures.' In light of this heightened role, the Pennsylvania legislature recently passed amendments to the state's 1982 Abortion
Control Act,6 which have been called "the strictest in the country. ' 7 The validity of these amendments was challenged in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.8 Substantially revising the district
court's holding,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit ruled that provisions requiring informed consent
and disclosure, parental consent, reporting requirements, public
disclosure of certain information in reports, and a twenty-four
hour waiting period were constitutional.' 0 The court struck
down, however, a provision requiring spousal consent." On appeal, the United States Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's
findings while attempting to clarify the proper standard applicaI David J. Zampa, Note, The Supreme Court's Abortion Jurisprudence: Will The
Supreme Court Pass The "Albatross" Back To The States?, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 731,
731 (1990).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 Zampa, supra note 1, at 731, 742. By assuming the role of a judicial legislature, the Court infringed upon the rulemaking power of the legislature by evaluat-

ing the soundness of the policies the legislature drafted. Id. at 732.
4 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
5 Zampa, supra note 1, at 735.
6 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1992).
7 Ruth H. Axelrod, Note, Whose Womb Is It Anyway: Are Paternal Rights Alive and
Well Despite Danforth?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 685, 691 (1990).

8 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aft'd, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
9 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1990); see also
infra notes 13-28.

10 Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 687, 719 (3d Cir. 1991).
'1

Id. at 719.
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ble to abortion cases. 12
In 1988, five abortion clinics and one physician'" filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania challenging the constitutionality of certain 1988
amendments to Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act of 1982
(the Act).' 4 On May 23, 1988, the district court preliminarily enjoined several portions of the Act, and thereafter the court stayed
all further proceedings pending the United States Supreme
Court decision in Webster.' 5 Several months after the Webster decision, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted further amendments,
which plaintiffs thereafter challenged in an amended complaint,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1329 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The
abortion clinics bringing suit were Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania (PPSP), Reproductive Health and Counseling Center (RHCC), Women's
Health Services, Inc. (WHS), Women's Suburban Clinic (WSC), and Allentown
Women's Center (AWC). Id. Three of these clinics, PPSP, WHS, and WSC, were
non-profit organizations which, in addition to providing abortions, also provided
other health care services such as gynecological care, pregnancy testing, birth control education, and counseling services. Id. The remaining two clinics, RHCC and
AWC, were for-profit organizations. Id. RHCC performed only first and early second trimester abortions, while AWC provided first trimester abortions, pregnancy
testing and counseling, and contraceptive and gynecological care. Id.
The Physician was Dr. Thomas Allen, a private practitioner of obstetrics and
gynecology in Pennsylvania and an associate clinical professor in the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Pittsburgh. Id. At the time of suit,
Dr. Allen was also the Medical Director of WHS. Id.
14 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 687 (3d Cir. 1991). Pennsylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act was drafted based upon a model abortion
statute developed by Americans United for Life, a non-profit, Chicago-based antiabortion organization. Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1327. After revision by the Pennsylvania legislature, the Act was presented to the House and Senate as an amendment to a Senate Bill and was passed by the House and Senate, despite a veto by
then Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh. Id.; Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 751-52 (1986). Governor Thornburgh vetoed the legislation, arguing that certain provisions of the bill,
as well as the bill's "overall tone and tenor" would impose "an undue, and, in some
cases, unconstitutional burden upon even informed, mature adults intent upon obtaining an abortion under circumstances deemed permissible by the United States
Supreme Court." Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1327. After the 1982 Act was passed, but
before it was put into effect, it was challenged as unconstitutional. Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 752. The United States Supreme Court eventually heard the case and declared several provisions of the Act unconstitutional. Id. at 772; see id. at 751-54
(explaining the history of the Act); Nancy A. Nolan, Comment, Toward Constitutional
Abortion Control Legislation: The Pennsylvania Approach, 87 DICK. L. REV. 373, 373
(1983) (characterizing Pennsylvania's attempt to regulate abortion as a "curious
blend of the new and the old" drafted to both comply with and challenge the
Supreme Court's decision in Roe).
15 Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1325; see Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. 490 (1989).
12
'3
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the preto the Act. 6 In response, the district court broadened
17
liminary injunction to include the 1989 amendments.
After a trial on the merits, the district court found the original Act, as well as the 1988 and 1989 amendments, "hostile" to a
woman's right to obtain an abortion, and accordingly invalidated
and enjoined various sections of the Act.' 8 The district court invalidated the following provisions: (i) a definition of "medical
emergencies;"19 (ii) a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period
between the time a woman consented to an abortion and the actual performance of the abortion;20 (iii) a requirement that only
the physician performing the abortion disclose specific information to the woman; 2 ' (iv) a provision for content-based informed
Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1325; Casey, 947 F.2d at 687.
Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1325; Casey, 947 F.2d at 687.
Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1372. The court also noted that "substantial portions"
of the Act as amended in 1989 were merely "reenactment[s] of provisions" which
both the Third Circuit and the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in Thornburgh. Id.
19 Id. at 1377-78. The Act defined "medical emergency" as:
That condition which, on the basis of the physician's best clinical
judgment, so complicates a pregnancy as to necessitate the immediate
abortion of same to avert the death of the mother of for which a 24hour delay will create grave peril of immediate and irreversible loss of
a major bodily function."
18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1989). The court determined that this definition was too
narrow and could cause a physician to act contrary to his own best judgment, as the
definition failed to encompass situations which would create serious risks to a woman's health, but not a "serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment to a
major bodily function." Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1377-78.
20 Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1378. The court declared that an identical provision
had been found unconstitutional in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health Services, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). Id. The court also noted that this waiting
period would impose a significant burden on a woman's abortion decision by increasing costs and the risk of delay, while furthering no state interest in maternal
health. Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1378. The court distinguished this provision from a
similar provision held to be constitutionally valid in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.
Ct. 2926 (1990). Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1379. In Hodgson, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a forty-eight hour waiting period for minors seeking abortions, rationalizing that this time period was necessary to allow parental involvement in the minor's abortion decision. Id. The Pennsylvania district court
explained that the Hodgson court had clearly distinguished the situation from that
presented in Akron, and thus the Akron decision remained controlling in this context. Id.
21 Id. Section 3205(a)(1) of the Act required that the physician, and not his
agent, disclose to the woman seeking an abortion "(1) the nature of the proposed
treatment and procedure and of the risks and alternatives to the procedure; (2) the
probable gestational age of the fetus at the time the abortion is to be performed;
and (3) the medical risks associated with carrying the pregnancy to term." Id. at
1379 n.35. Reasoning that the same provision had been contained in the 1982 Act,
and that the Akron Court had invalidated a virtually identical provision, the district
16
17
18
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2 3
consent; 22 (v) mandatory informed parental consent for minors;
(vi) spousal notification for married women; 2 4 and (vii) a clause
permitting public inspection of reports that every abortion facility was required to file. 2 5 The court declared that these provisions attacked the very foundation of abortion rights established

court determined that this section unconstitutionally burdened a woman's right to
an abortion because it was not narrowly tailored to serve Pennsylvania's compelling
interest in protecting the mother's health. Id. at 1379-80. The court recognized
that there was no sufficient justification for not permitting this information to be
conveyed to the women by trained counselors who, "[i]n many instances . . . are
more understanding than physicians and have more time to spend with the patients." Id. at 1380.
22 Id. Section 3205 of the Act specified five types of information to be provided
to the woman "at least twenty-four hours prior to the abortion." Id. The information to be conveyed included: (i) the "nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and alternatives to the procedure or treatment that a
reasonable patient would consider material to the decision;" (ii) the "probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to be performed;"
(iii) the "medical risks associated with carrying her child to term;" (iv) the fact that
the "father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the support of the child;" and
(v) that "medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, child birth
and neonatal care." Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (a)(l) and-(2)). The
district court asserted that the information went "far beyond" what was normally
required of informed consent necessary to make a reasoned medical decision, and
structured the dialogue between the woman and her physician. Id. at 1381 (quoting
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 762-63 (1986)).
23 Id. at 1382. Parental informed consent was required by section 3206, which
allowed for a medical emergency exception and a judicial bypass alternative. Id. at
1382-83 n.39. The judicial bypass alternative permitted a minor to petition the
court for consent rather than obtaining it from a parent or guardian. Id. at 1383.
Under this provision, the court would authorize the physician to perform the abortion if the court had found that the minor was mature enough to give consent by
herself, or if an abortion would be in her best interests. Id. Although the court
recognized that a state may permissibly impose parental notice and consent provisions upon minors, the court found this particular provision unconstitutional because of its requirement of "informed" parental consent, which the court believed
would require a parent to make an "in-person" visit to the abortion provider. Id.
24 Id. at 1384. Under § 3209 of the Act, a physician was prohibited from performing an abortion upon a married woman unless she signed a statement providing that she had notified her husband about the intended abortion. Id. The section
allowed exceptions when the husband could not be located after diligent effort, if
the husband was not the father of the child, if the pregnancy was the result of
spousal sexual abuse, or if the woman believed that notifying her husband would
result in harm to her. Id. The district court determined that this provision imposed
a "legally significant burden on the abortion decision" while failing to further any
of the compelling state interests identified in Roe. Id. at 1384-85; see Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 154, 163 (1973) (identifying the state's compelling interests in maternal health and potential life).
25 Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1390. All facilities performing abortions were required
to file certain reports under the Act, which were subject to public inspection if the
facility had "received state appropriated funds during the preceding twelve
months." Id. The district court predicted that such public disclosures would sub-
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by Roe v. Wade 26 and reaffirmed by the long line of cases following Roe. 7 According to the district court, these regulations were
not narrowly drawn to serve compelling state interests and thus
unconstitutionally burdened the woman's abortion decision. 8
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. 29 The Third Circuit partially reversed the district
court's finding, determining that all the provisions at issue, except the spousal notice requirement, were constitutionally permissible."0 In analyzing these regulations, the court of appeals
first clarified the proper standard of review applicable to abortion
regulations, reasoning that Justice O'Connor's "undue burden"
standard was controlling.3" Using this undue burden standard,
ject the women seeking abortions to an increased risk of harassment from antiabortion demonstrators picketing in front of the clinics. Id.
26 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27 Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1373; see, e.g., Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 n. I (1983) ("These are especially compelling reasons for
adhering to stare decisis in applying the principles of Roe v. Wade."); Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986)
("[T]he constitutional principles that led this Court to its decision in [Roe] . . . still
provide the compelling reason for recognizing the constitutional dimensions of a
woman's right to decide whether to end her pregnancy.").
28 Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1373-74, 1396. Two provisions of the Act were upheld
by the district court, however. Id. at 1396. Section 3210(a) of the Act mandated
that, except in the case of medical emergencies, no physician may perform an abortion without first making a determination of the probable gestational age of the
fetus. Id. at 1388-89. The Act required only that the doctor perform such tests or
examinations which a "prudent physician would consider necessary to make or perform in making an accuratediagnosis with respect to gestational age." Id. (emphasis in
original). Because the requirement was "reasonably related to the Commonwealth's compelling interest in the protection of maternal health," the district court
perceived no burden on the woman's abortion decision. Id. at 1389.
Sections 3214(a) and 3214(h) contained several reporting requirements to be
disclosed by the abortion provider. Id. at 1391. The district court upheld all but
two of these: a requirement that any referring physician be identified on a report,
and a requirement that the physician disclose the basis for his medical judgment in
several areas. Id. at 1392-93. The court found no justification for the name of the
referring physician to appear on the report, reasoning that such a requirement was
unrelated to maternal health, and was likely to cause physicians to "refuse to refer
patients to abortion clinics." Id. at 1392. The court found that to enforce the provision regarding the basis for the physician's medical judgment would impermissibly interfere with the woman's abortion decision and create a "chilling effect upon
the physician's exercise of his judgment." Id. at 1393.
29 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 719 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S.
Ct. 2791.
30 Id. at 719.
31 Id. at 688-97. The Court emphasized that stare decisis dictated that earlier
cases applying a standard different from Justice O'Connor's undue burden standard were no longer binding on lower courts. Id. at 697-98 (citing Akron v. Akron
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the court held that only the spousal notification provision placed
an undue burden on the woman's abortion decision. 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in
a ruling that contained five separate opinions, utilized the "undue burden" standard to uphold the Third Circuit's conclusions
on each of the challenged regulations . In so doing, the Court
redefined the "undue burden" standard while reaffirming Roe v.
Wade. 34 The decision did, however, produce four Justices who
called for Roe's overturn. 5
The Supreme Court first considered state abortion regulations in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.36 In Roe, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Texas statute that criminalized all abortions
except those necessary either to save the mother's life or to protect her health.3 7 In so holding, Roe also effectively invalidated
similar statutes in other states.3 ' The Roe Court prohibited absolute state regulation of abortions by deeming abortion a fundamental right encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)).
Justice O'Connor's undue burden standard employed a strict scrutiny level of
review if a regulation on abortion causes an undue burden on a woman's abortion
decision, while using a rational basis test if the regulation does not. Id. at 688-89.
TheJustice defined an undue burden as one which creates an " 'absolute obstacle []
or severe limitation [] on the abortion decision.' " Id. at 690 (quoting Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 464 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)). Justice O'Connor first articulated an adherence to this standard while
dissenting in Akron and consistently used the standard in every case before Casey.
See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3063 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] regulation imposed on a lawful abortion is not
unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.") (quoting
Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.
Ct. 2926, 2949-50 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It has been my understanding in this area that '[i]f the particular regulation does not 'unduly burde[n]' the
fundamental right. .. then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.'
(quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 453)).
Justice O'Connor's early application of the undue burden standard had been
criticized by commentators, who noted that "[s]he has yet to find an abortion regulation she didn't like." Alexander Wohl, The Abortion Cases, 76 A.B.A.J. 68, 70 (Feb.
1990) (quoting David O'Brien, a Professor of government at the University of
Virginia).
32 Casey, 947 F.2d at 719.
33 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
34 Id. at 2804, 2819, 2821-23.
35 Id. at 2855, 2873. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia and
Thomas advocated overturning Roe. See infra notes 385-87.
36 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37 Id. at 117-18, 166.
38 Id. at 118 n.2; Zampa, supra note 1, at 731 n.3.

19921

NOTE

261

right of privacy.3 9 Having deemed abortion a fundamental right,
the Supreme Court determined that state regulations on abortion would be subject to strict scrutiny and would be upheld only
to further compelling state interests."
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Roe, declared
that the fundamental right to an abortion was limited, and identified two compelling state interests that could justify certain regulations on abortion: the protection of both maternal health and
potential life.4" Dictating the proper balance between maternal
and fetal rights, the Court asserted that these competing interests
39 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. The Court acknowledged that there was no explicit
right of privacy mentioned in the Constitution, but cited a long line of cases in
which such a right was attributed to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. The Supreme Court first specifically recognized a right to privacy
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), holding that such a right emanated from the "penumbras of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 152. The Roe court related
this right of privacy to the abortion context by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
153. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. The Court supported this connection by outlining cases in which the Court
found a privacy right in marital activities, procreation, the use of contraceptives,
family relationships, and in child rearing and education. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53
(citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (child rearing); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (child rearing and education); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (family relationships); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (the marital relation); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (use
of contraceptives)).
The Roe decision has been the subject of numerous commentaries, both critical
and laudatory. Philip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and The Trees:
Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REV. 765, 765 (1973). For example, ProfessorJohn Hart Ely criticized the Roe court for deeming the abortion right fundamental, finding this idea totally lacking in constitutional support. John H. Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf A Commentary of Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 936-37 (1973). Ely
also opined that Roe made a "quantum jump" in finding this constitutional right,
rather than by gradually building it on established constitutional rights. Id. at 936
n.93.
On the other hand, Professors Heymann and Barzelay found much precedential support for Roe. Heymann & Barzelay, supra, at 784. Although these professors
recognized that the Roe opinion was not written in such a way as to clearly identify
the long-standing precedential support for the outcome, the authors hail the decision as "justified in both reason and precedent." Id.
40 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56. The Court reasoned that past precedent had determined that "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are involved," regulations may
only be justified by a showing that they promote a "compelling state interest," "and
that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate
state interests at stake." Id. at 155. This type of review is known as "strict scrutiny,"
and traditionally has been used by the Court to review legislation which regulated
fundamental rights. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.3 (4th ed. 1991).
41 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154, 159.
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were compelling only at certain times during the pregnancy. 42
The Court, therefore, constructed a trimester approach to pregnancy.43 Under this approach, the majority pronounced that the
state's interest in maternal health became compelling only at the
end of the first trimester, when an abortion was more dangerous
than childbirth. 4 Justice Blackmun declared that the state's interest in potential life was compelling only at the point of viability. 4 5 Because the Court had recognized no compelling state

interest during the first trimester, the majority held that no substantial regulations could be placed on abortions during that period. 46 The Court determined, however, that the state could
regulate abortion, at other stages of pregnancy, to further the
two enunciated compelling interests.4 7
Because the Roe decision had left the state legislatures virtually powerless to promote their interests, the Court soon was deluged with cases regarding state laws testing the limits of Roe.48
The first of these cases was PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth,49 which
reached the Supreme Court three years after Roe.5 °
In Danforth, an abortion clinic and two physicians challenged
42 Id. at 162-63. The court noted that the interest in maternal health and the
interest in potential life must be regarded as "separate and distinct," each growing
in importance at different stages of the woman's pregnancy. Id.
43 Id. at 163.

44 Id. The Court found this to be true based on medical data that established
that "until the end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth." Id. The Court thus concluded that after the end of the
first trimester, a state could place regulations on abortion reasonably related to
protecting maternal health. Id.
45 Id. The Court did not specifically define viability, but indicated that this is the
point when a fetus is capable of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id.
The majority asserted that viability usually occurred at about twenty-eight weeks,
but sometimes occurred as early as twenty-four weeks. Id. at 160. The Court also
noted that after viability states could "go so far as to proscribe abortions." Id. at
163-64.
Yale Law ProfessorJohn H. Ely, criticized the Court for focusing on the viability point as the point at which potential life became compelling. Ely, supra note 39,
at 924. Professor Ely commented that historically, the critical point in fetal development had been recognized as "quickening," "the point at which the fetus begins
discernibly to move independently of the mother." Id. Professor Ely asserted that
the majority furnished no conclusive reasoning as to why viability should be the
point that renders the interest in potential life compelling. Id. at 924-25.
46 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
47 Id.

48 Zampa, supra note 1, at 732 n.6.
49 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
50 Id. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority labelled this case the "logical
and anticipated corollary to Roe," as it raised "issues secondary to those that were
then before the Court." Id. at 55.
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the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that extensively regulated abortion. 5 ' The challenged provisions required the informed written consent from the woman seeking an abortion and
the written consent of her spouse or of a parent if she was a minor, and imposed certain reporting and recordkeeping requirements on abortion providers.52 In assessing these provisions,
Justice Blackmun, writing the Court's opinion, applied the strict
scrutiny test only to those provisions found to create an undue
burden5" on the woman's abortion decision and evaluated the
other provisions under a rational-relation standard. 54
Examining the parental and spousal consent provisions, Justice Blackmun determined that both provisions were unduly bur51 Id. at 56.

Id. at 58. The reporting and recordkeeping requirements were found in sections 10 and 11 of the Missouri Act, providing that every abortion facility and every
physician performing abortions must keep records of the procedures on designated
forms. Id. at 59. These records would compile the "relevant maternal health and
life data and . . . monitor all abortions performed to assure that they . . . [were]
done only under and in accordance with the provisions of the law." Id. at 79.
Other challenged aspects of the statute were its definition of viability; a requirement that the physician, under penalty of manslaughter, "exercise professional care 'to preserve the life and health of the fetus;' " a declaration that any
infant surviving a non-emergency abortion would be deemed a ward of the state,
depriving the mother (and the father if he had consented to the abortion) of all
rights to the child; and a finding that the "saline amniocentesis" method of abortion was detrimental to maternal health after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy,
and thus prohibited after that time. Id. at 58.
With respect to the Act's definition of viability as "that stage in fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the
womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems," the Court determined this to
be a reasonable attempt to comply with Roe and declared it constitutional. Id. at 6365. The Court announced, however, that the prohibition of the saline amniocentesis abortions and the physician's standard of care requirements were unconstitutional. Id. at 79, 83. The majority asserted that the prohibition on the saline
amniocentesis method of abortion bore no rational relation to the protection of
maternal health, as it was the most common and the safest currently available
method of abortion. Id. at 77, 79. The majority also concluded that the physician's
standard of care requirement unconstitutionally required the physician to preserve
the life and health of the fetus before viability. Id. at 83.
53 An undue burden had been recognized in situations creating "absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision." See Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
54 Zampa, supra note 1, at 749. The rational-relation test gives much deference
to legislation in scrutinizing government action. NOWAK & RO-uNDA, supra note 40,
at § 14.3. Under this standard the Court will only invalidate a law if it had no rational relationship to any legitimate interest of government. Id. State legislation is
rarely invalidated under this test. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 689
(3d Cir. 1991), afld, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
52
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densome to the abortion decision. 55 The Court recognized that
the application of both provisions would delegate to a third party
an unlimited veto power over the abortion decision, thus placing
an absolute obstacle on the decision.56 Moreover, the majority,
applying strict scrutiny, perceived no compelling state interests
to justify these burdens and declared the provisions unconstitutional.
Justice Blackmun implied, however, that although a
statute requiring a husband's consent would probably never pass
constitutional muster, 58 a properly drafted parental consent provision for minors might withstand scrutiny. 59
55 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71, 75. The spousal consent provision provided that a
married woman seeking an abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
must first obtain the written consent of her spouse, except where the abortion was
necessary to save the woman's life. Id. at 67-68. The Court argued that because the
state could not place any conditions upon abortions during this period of pregnancy, it could not delegate such a power to the husband. Id. at 69. The Court used
a similar rationale for striking down the parental consent provision. Id. at 74. The
majority recognized that minors are protected by the same constitutional rights as
adults, and thus cautioned that "the state may not impose a blanket provision...
requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first twelve weeks of her pregnancy. Id.
56 Id. at 71, 75. The Court recognized the interest of the husband in his wife's
pregnancy and the state's interest in the marital relationship. Id. at 69. The Court
did not find, however, that the marital relationship would be furthered by giving
the husband such a veto power over his wife's abortion decision. Id. at 71. Further,
the Court asserted that the wife's interest in her pregnancy would always outweigh
the husband's, as it is she who must physically bear the child and endure the effects
of pregnancy. Id. The Court also stated that the asserted interest in the familial
unit and in parental authority was not supported by the parental consent statute. Id.
at 75.
57 Id. at 71, 75.
58 Id. at 71. The Court recognized that when the husband's and wife's interest
are in conflict, the wife's interest will always prevail, as she alone physically bears
the child and is "more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy." Id.
59 Id. at 71, 75. The Court stressed that the fault with this Missouri provision
was that it imposed upon the minor a prerequisite of "special-consent" to an abortion from someone other than the woman or her physician. Id. at 75. The Court
emphasized that its holding was not meant to "suggest that every minor, regardless
of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy." Id.
Commentary on the spousal notification aspect of Danforth has suggested that
this decision did not sufficiently clarify the position that the husband had no fundamental interest in the fetus his wife carries. Ruth H. Axelrod, Note, Whose Womb Is
Anyway: Are PaternalRights Alive And Well Despite Danforth?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 685,
687-88 (1990). Therefore, a plethora of cases have arisen in lower courts in which
husbands have attempted to enjoin their wives from obtaining an abortion, claiming a fundamental interest in the fetus. Id. Such commentary further suggests that
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989), will only exacerbate the situation, as Webster permitted a
much greater degree of state regulation of abortions than was permitted in the
past. Id. at 688-90; see also, Andrea M. Sharrin, Note, PotentialFathers and Abortion: A
Woman's Womb Is NotA Man's Castle, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1359, 1404 (1989) (detailing
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The Court next reviewed the Missouri statute's provisions
requiring the woman's informed consent and the physician's
mandatory recordkeeping and reporting, and found that neither
provision created an undue burden.6 Justice Blackmun declared
that the state's interest in ensuring a woman's full awareness of
the nature and consequences of an abortion justified the woman's informed consent provision. 6 ' The Justice also observed
that the recordkeeping and reporting requirements reasonably
advanced the state's interest in protecting maternal health by
compiling relevant medical data regarding abortion.62 Having
identified the legitimate state ends served by these provisions,
the Court accordingly upheld them as constitutional under Roe.63
Almost contemporaneous with the Court's consideration of
the Missouri statute in Danforth, the Court also confronted the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts abortion statute' in Bellotti v.
Baird.65 The Massachusetts law required a woman under the age
of eighteen to obtain the consent of both parents before having
an abortion.6 6 In contrast to the parental consent provision in
Danforth, the Massachusetts statute provided an option for judi67
cial consent when parental consent could not be obtained.
Although the Court indicated that such an option could remove
the undue burden of a parental consent provision, the Court declined to render a decision because the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court had not yet interpreted the statute; therefore the
Court remanded the case for such interpretation.68
the arguments advanced by potential fathers, and concluding that a recognition
that a husband could prevent his wife's abortion would violate a woman's right to
equal protection).
60 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 66-67, 80-81; Zampa, supra note 1, at 749 (discussing
Danforth).
61 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67. The Court noted that the abortion decision is serious and stressful, making it "imperative" that the decision be made with the woman's complete knowledge "of its nature and consequences." Id.
62 Id. at 81. The Court determined that because the information required to be
disclosed by this provision would be kept confidential, the requirement was constitutionally permissible and presented no undue burden on the abortion decision. Id.
The Court cautioned, however, that the State may not, "through the sheer burden
of record-keeping detail," attempt to accomplish what has been "held to be an
otherwise unconstitutional restriction." Id.
63 Id. at 67, 81.
64 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §§ 121-12U (West 1992).
65 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I).
66 Id. at 134.
67 Id. at 134-35.
68 Id. at 147. The court pronounced that it had consistently held that "abstention is appropriate when an unconstrued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for
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Four years later, in 1979, the Bellotti case returned to the
Supreme Court.6 9 Justice Powell, rendering the Supreme
federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the
problem.' " Id. at 146-47 (quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)).
69 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II). The original plaintiffs objected to the interpretation that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts gave
to the statute and therefore initiated suit once again in the district court. Id. at 631.
The original plaintiffs, who became the appellees in this case, were: William Baird,
founder and director of Parents Aid Society, Inc.; Parents Aid Society, a Massachusetts non-profit abortion center; Gerald Zupnick, M.D., a physician who regularly
performed abortions at Parents Aid Society; and "Mary Moe," a pseudonym for a
minor woman who was pregnant at the time the suit was commenced and who was
permitted to represent a "class of unmarried minors in Massachusetts who ...
[had] adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent [to abortion], and who
...[did] not wish to involve their parents." Id.at 626 (quoting Baird v. Bellotti, 393
F. Supp. 847, 850 (Mass. 1975)); see also Bellotti v. Baird, (Bellotti 1), 428 U.S. 132,
137-38 (1976) (describing the plaintiffs).
The Supreme Judicial Court had considered § 12S of the Massachusetts statute, which provided in part:
If the mother is less than eighteen years of age and has not married,
the consent of both the mother and her parents [to an abortion to be
performed on the mother] is required. If one or both of the mother's
parents refuse such consent, consent may be obtained by order of a
judge of the superior court for good cause shown, after such hearing
as he deems necessary. Such a hearing will not require the appointment of a guardian for the mother. If one of the parents has died or
has deserted his or her family, consent by the remaining parent is sufficient. If both parents have died or have deserted their family, consent of the mother's guardian or other person having duties similar to
a guardian, or any person who had assumed the care and custody of
the mother is sufficient. The commissioner of public health shall prescribe a written form for such consent. Such form shall be signed by
the proper person or persons and given to the physician performing
the abortion who shall maintain it in his permanent files.
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 625 (citing MASS. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 112, §§ 12Q 12T, and
12U (West Supp. 1979)).
The Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court, in interpreting this provision, held
that: (1) generally, a minor could not seek judicial consent unless the consent of
both of her parents was first sought; (2) parents deciding whether or not to give
consent to their minor daughter's abortion could consider only her best interests;
(3) judicial consent would only be granted by considering the minor's best interests, and would not consider objections of the parents; (4) a judge could withhold
consent, even when he found the minor to be mature and capable enough to make
the abortion decision on her own, if the judge believed that an abortion was not in
the minor's best interests. Id. at 630.
The district court declared the statute unconstitutional as interpreted, citing
three problematic aspects: (1) the statute's requirement of parental notice in all
cases where a parent was available, even when judicial notice was sought; (2) the
statute's authorization of a judge's veto of the minor's abortion decision even if the
minor was found to be mature enough to give informed consent, and (3) the statute's overbreadth created by the absence of a clear mandate that parents consider
only the best interests of the minor in deciding whether to give consent. Id. at 631-
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Court's opinion, affirmed the district court's finding that the
abortion restrictions were unconstitutional. 70 The majority
weighed three factors in its decision: the minor's constitutional
right under Roe to an abortion free of unduly burdensome restrictions, 7' the states' right to place more limitations on the conduct of minors than on adults,72 and the parents' interests in the
upbringing of their children. 73 Justice Powell concluded that parental notice and consent statutes were constitutionally permissible if a third party would not have an absolute veto power over
the abortion. 4
To ensure the constitutional guarantees afforded to the
abortion decision, the Court announced that any statute requiring parental consent must also contain an alternative procedure
in which a minor may obtain consent.75 The majority instructed
that such a procedure must ensure anonymity and expediency,
and must permit the minor to show either that she is mature
enough to make a well-informed abortion decision on her own,
or that an abortion is in her best interests. 76 Accordingly, beId. at 651.
Id. at 633, 642. The majority recognized that "the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman ...is not mitigated by her minority." Id. at 642.
Rather, the Court posited that a minor may be more burdened by an unwanted
pregnancy, due to her lack of education and employment opportunities, as well as
her emotional immaturity. Id. The Court also observed that the decision to abort is
not one which could be postponed until the minor reaches the age of majority. Id.
at 642-43.
72 Id. at 635. The majority found that although children are entitled to the same
degree of due process protections as adults in cases concerning the deprivation of
liberty and property rights, the State is permitted to "adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern .... sympathy, and
...paternal attention.' " Id. (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550
(1971)).
73 Id. at 637. The Court observed that parents have a large measure of authority
in raising their children, permitting parents to guide in the development of their
offspring. Id. at 637-38. The majority concluded that "the tradition of parental
authority is not inconsistent with our tradition of individual liberty," noting that
laws placing restrictions on the actions of minors aid in the child's "full growth and
maturity." Id. at 638-39.
74 Id. at 643.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 643-44. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that such a
statute would not fall within the ambit of Danforth, as a judicial proceeding gives a
judge an absolute veto over the woman's abortion decision. Id. at 653-54 (Stevens,
J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens posited that the decision whether
or not to grant consent rests solely with the judge in a judicial proceeding, even if
the judge "finds 'that the minor is capable of making, and has made, an informed
and reasonable decision to have an abortion.' " Id. at 653 (Stevens,J., concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N.E.2d
288, 293 (1977)). Therefore, the Justice concluded that no minor in Massachusetts
70
71
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cause the Massachusetts statute failed to provide these elements,
the majority struck it down as unconstitutional."
The Supreme Court utilized its Bellotti I analysis in H.L. v.
Matheson.78 In Matheson, a pregnant minor challenged a Utah
statute that mandated notification of a woman's husband or of a
minor woman's parents, if possible, before an abortion could be
performed. 79 The Court determined this provision to be constitutionally permissible under Danforth and Bellotti H, as it did not
transfer a veto power to any third party, nor did it create an undue burden.8 0 The Court distinguished this provision from those
at issue in Danforth and Bellotti H, however, by noting that this
provision merely required parental notice, not consent."' The majority observed that Bellotti H had expressly failed to equate parental notice with parental consent requirements.8 2 The Court thus
determined that alternative proceedings were not required for
parental notice statutes.8 " Therefore, after identifying an important state interest which
the provision furthered, 4 the majority
85
upheld the statute.

Danforth, Bellotti H, and Matheson represent the Court's first
attempts to follow Roe and its trimester approach. 6 The
Supreme Court subjected the state legislation to the undue burden standard of review to permit the states to advance the two
compelling interests recognized in Roe: the protection of matercould receive an abortion without receiving the consent of either both parents or a
judge, thus subjecting every minor to an absolute third party veto. Id. at 653-54
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
77 Id. at 651.
78 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
79 Id. at 400. The Court scrutinized the Utah statute only as it applied to immature and unemancipated minors, determining that the plaintiff lacked standing to
assert a claim on behalf of married or mature minors. Id. at 405-07. The plaintiff
was a fifteen year old girl who was living with, and dependent on her parents at the
time she discovered she was pregnant. Id. at 400. The plaintiff wanted to obtain an
abortion, but did not wish to notify her parents of her decision, as was required by
the Utah statute. Id. at 400-01. Therefore, the plaintiff instituted suit to challenge
this statute. Id. at 401.
80 Id. at 411, 413.
81 Id. at 409.

Id. at 411 n.17.
Id.
The Court found that this provision would allow parents to furnish required
medical information to the doctor performing the abortion, and furthered the goal
of family integrity by allowing parents to protect their child from making a wrong
decision in this area. Id. at 411-12.
85 Id. at 413.
86 Zampa, supra note 1, at 748-52 (analyzing Danforth, Bellotti II and Matheson).
82
83
84
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nal health and potential life.8 7 Applying this standard, the Court
evaluated the legislation under a strict scrutiny review only when
the legislation unduly burdened the abortion decision, and applied the rational-relation standard to legislation that was not unduly burdensome. 8 8
The Court abandoned the unduly burdensome approach,
however, in Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health,8 9 and instead applied the strict scrutiny standard to all aspects of an Ohio
statute regardless of the presence or absence of an undue burden.9 0 The provisions of the Ohio statute9 challenged in Akron
required the following: i) hospitalization for all abortions performed after the first trimester; ii) parental consent for women
under fifteen years of age; iii) parental notice or a court order for
women under the age of eighteen; iv) disclosure of specific information by the doctor performing the abortion to ensure the woman's informed consent; and v) a twenty-four hour waiting
period between the woman's consent and abortion procedure.9 2
The Court found that each provision posed an undue burden and
applied strict scrutiny to strike each down.93
Addressing the hospitalization requirement, Justice Powell,
authoring the majority opinion, acknowledged that under Roe, restrictions on abortions after the first trimester were intended to
promote the State's compelling interest in maternal health and
were therefore constitutional. 94 Justice Powell, however, added a
Id.
88 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 688-97 (3d Cir. 1991) (outlining the Court's use of strict scrutiny and rational basis standards).
87

89 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
90 Zampa, supra note 1, at 752-53; Akron, 462 U.S. at 427 ("But restrictive state
regulation of the right to choose abortion, as with other fundamental rights subject
to searching judicial examination, must be supported by a compelling state
interest.").
91 AKRON, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 160-1978 (1978).
92 Akron, 462 U.S. at 422-24. Another challenged provision required the "humane and sanitary" disposal of fetal remains. Id. at 424 (quoting AKRON, OHIO ORDINANCE No. 160-1978, § 1870.16 (Feb. 1978)). The Court struck down this
provision, claiming its ambiguity implied a mandate that the physician provide a
"decent burial" for a fetus. Id. at 451. As such, the Court determined it failed to
give a physician "fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden" and therefore violated due process. Id. at 451-52 (quoting U.S. v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617

(1954)).
93 Id. at 426-27, 452.
94 Id. at 433; see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). For example, the Court

noted that the Roe Court specifically asserted that states could require that abortions be performed in a hospital. Akron, 462 U.S. at 433.
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new factor to Roe's trimester framework.9 5 The Justice declared
that a state regulation that placed restrictions on second trimester abortions must also adhere to the accepted medical practice
for the entire period to which the regulation applied.9 6 The majority declared that it was not accepted medical practice to require hospitalization during the entire second trimester and
struck the provision. 97
Despite the absence of an "absolute obstacle" to abortion,
the majority, under a strict scrutiny standard, also invalidated the
informed consent and disclosure requirements and the twentyfour hour waiting period.98 The majority submitted that the information required to be disclosed by the doctor, which involved
the nature, risks, and alternatives to abortion, placed unreasonable obstacles upon the physician's medical judgment. 99 The
Court also found the requirement that only the attending physician relate the information served no vital state need. 10 0 Similarly, the majority invalidated the twenty-four hour waiting
period because the Court was unconvinced that the provision was
95 Id. at 434; see Zampa, supra note 1, at 753 (the Court "added a new dimension" to the trimester approach).
96 Akron, 462 U.S. at 434. The Court stated that "if it appears that during a
substantial portion of the second trimester the State's regulation 'depart[s] from
accepted medical practice,' . . . the regulation may not be upheld simply because it
may be reasonable for the remaining portion of the trimester." Id.; see also Zampa,
supra note 1, at 753.
97 Akron, 462 U.S. at 434-35. The Court cited to the district court findings,
which showed that the majority of second trimester abortions were performed
outside of hospitals, and thus concluded that such a hospitalization requirement
would unduly burden the woman's abortion right. Id. at 435.
98 Id. at 442, 445. The majority conceded that an informed consent provision
had been found constitutional in Danforth, but determined that Akron's additional
requirements that the physician make certain disclosures to the woman in order to
obtain informed consent rendered the statute unconstitutional. Id. See Zampa, supra
note 1, at 754-55.
99 Akron, 462 U.S. at 445. The Akron statute required the physician to inform
the woman
[t]hat abortion is a major surgical procedure which can result in serious complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and
prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and that abortion may leave
essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing psychological
problems she may have and can result in severe emotional
disturbances.

Id. at 445 n.36 (quoting

AKRON, OHIO ORDINANCE

No. 160-1978, § 1870.06(B)(5)

(Feb. 1978)).
100 Id. at 448. The Court rejected Akron's assertion that non-physician's were
not properly trained and qualified to relay and discuss the information required,
finding no support for this assertion. Id.
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reasonably related to the state's legitimate interest in ensuring
informed consent.' 0 '
The Court also struck down the parental consent requirement, 10 2 finding that it did not provide the type of alternative
proceeding for a minor mandated in Bellotti 11.103 The Court recognized that the provision allowed a minor to circumvent the
need for parental consent with a court order but found this provision insufficient to satisfy Bellotti II, because the statute lacked
explicit provisions for a judicial proceeding wherein the minor's
maturity or best interests could be considered.'t 4 Accordingly,
the majority disregarded Akron's argument that when an unconstrued statute may be subsequently interpreted by the state judi10 5
ciary, abstention by the federal court would be appropriate.
In a vehement dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's interpretation of the trimester approach and claimed that
the majority distorted the undue burden standard. 0 6 TheJustice
recognized the inevitable confusion resulting from the majority's
efforts to make the trimester scheme comport with advancing
101 Id. at 450. The majority observed that the physician should have the sole
discretion to advise a patient whether or not to proceed with an abortion Id.
102 The parental consent provision was found in § 1870.05(B) of the Ohio ordinance. Id. at 439. This section provided that a minor under the age of fifteen could
not receive an abortion without first obtaining the written informed consent of one
of her parents or a guardian, or obtaining a court order. Id.
103 Id. at 439-40.
i04 Id. at 440-41. The Court reiterated the Bellotti II Court's holding which stated
that a parental consent statute must also contain an alternative proceeding for the
minor to obtain consent, in which the minor could show either that she was mature
enough to make the abortion decision on her own, or that an abortion was in her
best interests. Id. at 439-40 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979)
(Bellotti II)).
105 Id. at 439. For an explanation of the abstention doctrine, see MARTIN REDISH,
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY (1991); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 593-

612 (1989).
106 Akron, 462 U.S. at 452-53 (O'Connor,J., dissenting); Susan M. Halatyn, Comment, Sandra Day O'Connor,Abortion, And Compromise For The Court, 5 ToURo L. REV.
327, 333-36 (1989). TheJustice opined that the " 'unduly burdensome' standard
should be applied to the challenged regulations throughout the entire pregnancy
without reference to the particular 'stage' of pregnancy involved." Akron, 462 U.S.
at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Justice stressed that if the regulation was
not found to unduly burden the abortion right, the evaluation was "limited to [a]
determination that the regulation rationally relate[d] to a legitimate state purpose."
Id. Justice O'Connor chastised the majority by stating, "[i]rrespective of what we
may believe is wise or prudent policy in this difficult area, 'the Constitution does
not constitute us as 'Platonic Guardians' nor does it vest in this Court the authority
to strike down laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social
policy, 'wisdom,' or 'common sense." " Id. (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
242 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
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medical technology and the attendant burden placed on a state
trying to adhere to the trimester framework. 0 7 The Justice also
disagreed with the viability standard utilized.' °8 Justice
O'Connor posited that potential life was no less potential before
viability, and hence the state's interest in potential life was present throughout all stages of pregnancy. 09 Justice O'Connor
therefore completely rejected the trimester framework as an analysis destined to collide with itself." 0
Justice O'Connor also called for the re-application of the undue burden standard, noting that the Court had often applied
this test to restrictions on fundamental rights, including abortion."' Accordingly, the Justice denounced the majority's application of strict scrutiny to every provision." 2 Moreover, the
dissenting Justice emphasized that a court applying the undue
burden test should carefully examine how the legislature had ad107 Id. at 455-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Justice found that the Roe trimester approach had created "lines" defining permissible and impermissible regulations at particular points of the pregnancy. Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor recognized that the majority's new component that a regulation
adhere to "accepted medical practice" "blurred" these lines. Id. The Justice observed that a "State ... [could] no longer rely on a 'bright line' that separate[d]
permissible from impermissible regulation, and it [was] no longer free to consider
the second trimester as a unit and weigh the risks posed by all abortion procedures
throughout that trimester." Id.
108 Id. at 459 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See, generally, Philip J. Prygoski, Abortion
and the Right to Die: JudicialImposition of A Theory of Life, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 67
(1992) (contending that the Court, in cases such as Roe, has imposed value judgments of various stages of life).
109 Akron, 462 U.S. at 459-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor posited that "[j]ust as
improvements in medical technology inevitably will move forward the point at which
the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health, different technological improvements will move backward the point of viability at which the State may proscribe abortions except when necessary to preserve the life and health of the
mother." Id. at 456-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
I I Id. at 461-62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor cited a number of
abortion cases which had utilized this standard. Id. at 461 n.8 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Justice also observed that in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court applied this test in the
context of a liberty interest, finding that "strict judicial scrutiny" applied only when
legislation was found "to have 'deprived,' 'infringed,' or 'interfered' with the free
exercise of" a fundamental right. Id. at 462 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1973)). Additionally, Justice O'Connor cited First Amendment cases where this standard had
been applied. Id. at 462-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960)).
112 Id. at 463 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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dressed the problem.' 3 The Justice declared that a test as austere as strict scrutiny was to be used by the Court with restraint
and deference to legislative judgments." 1 4 Justice O'Connor concluded that under a proper application of the undue burden standard, none of the provisions at issue created an undue burden
that was not justified by a legitimate state interest." 5
The Court continued its trend of strictly scrutinizing all aspects of abortion regulations in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists." 6 The Thornburgh Court considered
several sections of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act of
1982,' 1' which had been challenged by several physicians and
abortion providers in Pennsylvania." 8 The challenged provi113 Id. at 465 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Justice referred to the legislatures
as the " 'ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts.'" Id. (quoting Missouri, K & T. R. Co. v. May, 194
U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
114 Id. at 463 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (citation omitted).
"15 Id. at 466, 468, 471, 473 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's finding that the hospitalization requirement created an
undue burden by increasing costs and decreasing the availability of abortions. Id. at
466 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Justice noted that no evidence had been
presented to justify the assertion that this regulation would decrease the availability
of abortions, and stated that any increased costs would be a reasonable means of
furthering the State's compelling interest in maternal health. Id. at 466-67
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Therefore, Justice O'Connor found that this provision
was not unduly burdensome, and identified the rational relation to the State's legitimate interest in the health of its citizens to uphold the provision. Id. at 467
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the majority's analysis of the parental
consent provision, chastising the majority for failing to apply the abstention doctrine. Id. at 469-70 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor declared that because the provision had not yet been construed by the state courts, the Supreme
Court was wrong to interfere with the "independence of state governments" by
imposing the Court's own interpretation of the statute upon the state. Id. at 470
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Addressing the informed consent provision, Justice O'Connor observed that a
similar provision previously had been upheld. Id. at 471 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)). The Justice
justified this regulation as furthering the state's interest that the abortion decision
is made with the knowledge necessary for an informed choice. Id. at 472
(O'ConnorJ., dissenting). The Justice upheld the twenty-four hour waiting period
under a similar analysis, finding that this provision was reasonably related to the
state's interest in ensuring that the woman make a "well-considered" choice. Id. at
473-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
117 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1982).
118 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 752, 758. Many of the challenged provisions were
similar to provisions struck down in Akron. For instance, § 3205 of the Pennsylvania Act required the woman to give informed consent after certain explicit
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sions: (i) required a woman to give informed consent after receiving certain information;" 9 (ii) mandated the recording of
specified information in a publicly available record, but keeping
the woman's identity confidential; 20 (iii) ordered a physician performing a post-viability abortion to exercise care to preserve the
life and health of the unborn child; and (iv) required the presto take
ence of a second physician during a post-viability abortion
2
reasonable steps to preserve the life of the child.' '
The majority applied strict scrutiny to invalidate all these
provisions, despite the absence of proof that any provision created an undue burden. 1 22 The Court held the informed consent
information was disclosed to her by the physician, a provision very similar to Akron's informed consent and disclosure requirement. Id. at 760.
119 Id. Two sections of the Pennsylvania Act, § 3205 and § 3208, required that
"[s]even explicit kinds of information" be conveyed to the women in order for her
to give informed consent. Id. Five of these were required to be conveyed to the
woman by her physician, including:
(a) the name of the physician who will perform the abortion;
(b) the "fact that there may be detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not accurately foreseeable;"
(c) the "particular medical risks associated with the particular abortion procedure to be employed;"
(d) he probable gestational age; and
(e) the "medical risks associated with carrying her child to term."
Id. (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1982). The additional two kinds of information to be disclosed were the "fact that medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care," and "the 'fact that the father
is liable to assist' in the child's support, 'even in instances where the father has
offered to pay for the abortion.' " Id. at 760-61 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205
(a)(l)-(2) (1982)).
120 Id. at 765. Section 3211(a) of the Act required the physician performing an
abortion after the first trimester to disclose his basis for finding that the fetus was
not viable. Id. Sections 3214(a) and (h) required the physician to file detailed reports about the abortion which included the names of the referring physician and
the physician who performed the abortion; information about "the woman's political subdivision and State of residence, age, race, marital status, and number of
prior pregnancies; the date of her last menstrual period and the probable gestational age; [and] the basis for any judgment that a medical emergency existed." Id.
121 Id. at 768-70.
122 Id. at 772. Additionally, in striking down the informed consent, disclosure,
recordkeeping and reporting requirements, the Court disregarded the state's compelling interests in maternal health which could have justified these requirements.
Zampa, supra note 1, at 755-56; see Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759-68 (providing the
court's analysis of these provisions and the failure to recognize the compelling interests of maternal health).
Critics have denounced the Thornburgh and Akron Courts for using the doctrine
of substantive due process to strike down laws it considered "unwise." Zampa, supra
note 1, at 754-55. Substantive due process has not been given any generally accepted definition, but has come to refer to a liberal reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment in which rights that are not explicitly stated in the amendment are
attributed to it. Id. at 733-34 n.10. Courts have read rights, such as the right to
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and disclosure requirement unconstitutional because the information that women would receive was irrelevant to informed
consent and served no legitimate state interest. 2 3 The Court
also struck down the recordkeeping and reporting requirements,
claiming that the content of the required information was so personal that it was likely to reveal the identity of the woman, and
that the requirement would deter women from seeking
privacy, into the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of due process by reasoning
that "certain rights are so fundamental to our concepts of ordered liberty that, in
some cases, no process at all can deprive an individual of these rights, unless the
state has a compelling state interest and the law is narrowly tailored to affect only
that interest." Id. (citation omitted).
Substantive due process took on a negative connotation in the early part of this
century with the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). Ely, supra note 39, at 937. From the time of this decision until the 1930's,
the Supreme Court invalidated a great deal of legislation under the substantive due
process doctrine, often using the popular economic and social theories of the time
to find these laws impermissible. Id. The Supreme Court's decisions during this
time were sharply criticized for manufacturing rights that did not exist in the Constitution, and because the Justices often substituted their own views of wise social
policy instead of deferring to the legislatures. Id. The Supreme Court finally denounced such "Lochnerism" (as this type of decision-making came to be known) in
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), stating:
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, . . . and like cases - that due
process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely - has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional proposition
that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.
Id. at 937-38 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963)).
Although the Supreme Court remains critical of Lochnerism, commentators
have branded Roe v. Wade and its progeny as products of the Lochner philosophy. Id.
at 939-40; see also Scott C. Shelley, Note, 22 SETON HAL L. REV. 1529 n.2 (1992)
(providing a general analysis of substantive due process development).
123 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763. The Court recognized that generally informed
consent requirements were constitutionally permissible. Id. at 760 The Court referred to the holding in Akron, invalidating a similar informed consent and disclosure requirement because the information required to be disclosed to the woman
was designed to "influence the woman's informed choice between abortion and
childbirth." Id. (quoting Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S.
416, 443-44 (1983)). The Court also declared that this disclosure requirement "increase[d] the patient's anxiety, and intrude[d] upon the physician's exercise of
proper professional judgment." Id. at 764. But see id. at 801 (White, J., dissenting),
where Justice White's dissent recognized the truth in the majority's assertion that
information required to be delivered to the woman could increase her anxiety and
persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion. Id. The Justice espoused, however, that such a result would not render the provision unconstitutional because the
Roe decision was not meant to "maximiz[e] the number of abortions, but [to] maximiz[e] choice." Id. The Justice also declared that former Supreme Court decisions
permitted a state to "encourage women to ...favor ...childbirth rather than
abortion." Id.; see also Zampa, supra note 1,at 757 (noting that "Roe did not require
that states favor abortion over childbirth.").
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abortions. 12 4
Invalidating the physician's standard of care and the second
physician requirements, the Court set aside the state's compelling interest in potential life' 25 and instead focused on the provisions' failure to include a medical emergency exception. 126 The
majority asserted that the legislature intentionally omitted such
an exception, working an unconstitutional
"trade-off" between
27
the mother's health and fetal survival.1
Justice O'Connor penned another forceful dissent, reiterating the Akron dissent.' 21 Justice O'Connor again advocated the
application of the undue burden standard, and argued that the
majority had enacted a new test that distorted the undue burden
standard even more than the Akron holding.2 9 Under the majority's new standard, Justice O'Connor opined, the Court appeared
to strike down any regulation which posed even a slight possibility of deterring abortions for some women. 130 The Justice also
criticized the majority for "straining" to find an "anti-abortion"3
intent in the statute, thereby creating "bad constitutional law." 1
The direction of the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence changed dramatically with Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services.'" 2 The Webster majority abandoned the strict scrutiny ap124 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 766-67. The Court acknowledged that in Danforth it
had found recordkeeping and reporting requirements permissible, as long as they
protected the anonymity of the woman and were reasonably related to the protection of maternal health. Id. at 766.
125 Zampa, supra note 1, at 755-56; see Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-71.
126 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 770-71.
127 Id. at 768, 771.
128 Id. at 814 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 106-15 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Justice O'Connor's Akron dissent.
129 Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 829 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
stated that the majority had adopted "a per se rule under which any regulation
touching on abortion must be invalidated if it poses an 'unacceptable danger of
deterring the exercise of that right.' " Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 833 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Thornburgh has been referred to as the
"high-water mark in the Supreme Court's restriction of state abortion regulations,"
and as the "pinnacle of the Court's intervention into the states' sphere of legislative
authority." James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, What Does Webster Mean?, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 157, 158 n.5 (1989); Zampa, supra note 1, at 755. The Bopp &
Coleson article posited that this decision demonstrated "both the extremes to
which the Roe majority would go, and the rapidly eroding support for Roe." Bopp
& Coleson, supra, at 158 n.5 (referring to ChiefJustice Burger's defection from the
Roe majority to the dissent).
132 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Due to the new conservative majority in the Supreme
Court, many believed that Webster would be the test case that would overrule Roe.
Christopher A. Crain, Note,JudicialRestraint and The Non-Decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y. 263, 263-64 (1990). The
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proach evidenced in Akron and Thornburgh, instead exhibiting
considerable deference to the Missouri legislature. 5 3 Furthermore, the noteworthy Webster holding explicitly overruled Roe's
trimester scheme. 3 4 In doing so, the Court also implicitly overruled the reasoning in3 5the cases following Roe that relied on this
trimester framework.1

Webster concerned a challenge to a Missouri statute 3 6 regulating abortions, 3 7 with specific attacks aimed at: i) the preamble, which declared that life begins at conception and asserted as
protectable the interests of unborn children in life, well-being
and health;13 8 ii) a prohibition on the use of public facilities and
employees to perform abortions; iii) a ban on the use of public
funds for abortion counseling; and iv) a requirement that physicians conduct tests to determine viability before performing
abortions.'3 9 The Court found all these provisions constitutional, because they permissibly furthered a legitimate state
40

end. 1

Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on the viability-testing reCourt, however, took a position ofjudicial restraint - new to the Supreme Court in
the abortion context. Id. at 264-65. Thus, the Court only limited Roe, emphasizing
that Roe would only be reconsidered by a state statute directly calling it into question. Id. at 283-84.
133 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 131, at 158; Zampa, supra note 1, at 764.
134 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 131 at 163-64; Crain, supra note 132, at 282-83.
'35 Bopp & Coleson, supra note 131, at 157-59; Crain, supra note 132, at 282-83.
136 Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (1986).
'37 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 501 (1989).
138 Id. (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986)).
'39 Id. at 503.
140 Id. at 507, 511, 515, 519-20. In ruling on the preamble, the Court found that
the court of appeals had wrongly applied the dictum in Akron to strike this provision
down. Id. at 506. The Akron Court had declared that "a State may not adopt one
theory of when life begins to justify its regulation of abortions." Id. at 504-05
(quoting Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444
(1983)). Because the Missouri preamble stated that life begins at conception, the
court of appeals declared that it violated this language in Akron. Id. at 505. The
Supreme Court, however, determined that the statement in the preamble was not
used to regulate abortions, and thus it was simply a "value judgment," permissible
under Roe. Id. at 506.
With regard to the prohibition on the use of public employees and facilities to
perform abortions, the Court upheld these as valid under a line of abortion funding
cases previously decided. Id. at 511 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)). These
cases found it permissible to withhold public funds for abortion, provided the funds
were reallocated to childbirth-related expenses, reasoning that Roe permitted the
favoring of childbirth over abortion. Id. at 509-10. The Court therefore concluded
that Missouri's provision was constitutional. Id. at 511.

278

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:255

quirement. 14 ' In evaluating this provision, the plurality recognized that the statute furthered the state's interest in potential
life, which the Court found compelling in Roe. 142 The plurality
then noted that the Missouri provision seemed to conflict with
the Court's determination in Colautti v. Franklin,143 which held
that neither the state nor the courts could impose regulations on
medical judgments regarding fetal viability. 144 The Court attributed this conflict to the states' attempts to fashion regulations to
comport with the rigid trimester approach. 145 The plurality,
therefore, used this opportunity to reassess Roe's trimester
framework. 146 Postulating that the trimester approach had become an increasingly intricate regulatory labyrinth, inconsistent
with the "notion of a constitution cast in general terms," the plurality expressly denounced this portion of Roe. 147 The Court
opined that the state's interest in protecting human life existed
throughout pregnancy, not just after viability. 148 After discarding the burdensome trimester scheme, the plurality upheld the
furthering the state's inviability-testing provision as permissibly
1 49
life.
potential
protecting
in
terest
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence which has
emerged as the dominant opinion on this issue.' 5 ° Justice
141 Id. at 513-17. Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion was joined by only
Justices White and Kennedy. Id. at 498-99. Justices O'Connor and Scalia each
wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at 522, 532.
142 Id. at 516 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)); Zampa, supra note
1, at 771.
143 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
144 Webster, 492 U.S. at 516-17; Zampa, supra note 1, at 771.
145 Webster, 492 U.S. at 517.
146 Id. at 518-21.
147 Id. at 518. The plurality found that "[tihe key elements of the Roe framework
- trimesters and viability - are not found in the text of the Constitution or in any
place else one would expect to find a constitutional principle." Id. Therefore, the
plurality recognized that this framework offered no set guidelines for the states to
follow, and had become "unworkable in practice." Id. (quoting Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985)). The Court
also declared that the "rigid Roe framework" was not consistent with our "notion of
a constitution cast in general terms." Id. The plurality asserted that the trimester
framework had become so intricate that it was more of a "code of regulations" than
"a body of constitutional doctrine." Id.
148 Id. at 519.
149 Id. at 519-20.
15o Id. at 522. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment);
Bopp & Coleson, supra note 131, at 159-60. The Supreme Court case of Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), instructed that when a majority refuses to apply
a doctrine it is no longer binding precedent and a majority did not agree on a new
doctrine, then the lower courts are to regard as precedent the opinion of the Justice
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O'Connor agreed with the plurality's conclusion that the viability-testing provision was constitutional, but the Justice asserted
that the proper test to apply was the undue burden test.' 5 ' The
Justice disagreed, however, with the plurality's finding that this
provision conflicted with the Court's previous abortion decisions,
and thus found no need to reevaluate Roe's trimester framework.' 52 In applying the undue burden test, Justice O'Connor
found that the viability-testing regulation imposed no undue burden and
was rationally related to the preservation of potential
53
life. '

Webster's permissiveness in allowing states to place more regulations on abortion was reflected in Hodgson v. Minnesota. 154 The
Hodgson majority 55 considered a Minnesota statute's1 56 requirement of two-parent notification for a minor prior to obtaining an
abortion, and found it constitutional when accompanied by a judicial bypass option. 15 7 The Court reached this decision despite
1 58
the statute's characterization as the strictest in the nation.
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds. See Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 692-93 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining the application of Marks).
151 Webster, 492 U.S. at 529-30; Zampa, supra note 1, at 773.
152 Webster, 492 U.S. at 523. (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment); Zampa, supra note 1, at 773. The Justice cited the Supreme Court's
principle of refraining from deciding a constitutional question when there was no
need to. Webster, 492 U.S. at 525-26.
153 Webster, 492 U.S. at 530. Like the Roe decision, Webster also generated a torrent of commentary. Some commentators have praised the decision as a first-step
in overruling Roe, but without threatening "civil or contraceptive rights," and still
recognizing a woman's right to an abortion. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 131, at
177. Others have criticized Webster for what it failed to say, noting that the plurality
failed to adequately explain its reasoning for effectively overruling Roe. Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion And The Supreme Court: The Retreat From Roe v.
Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 83, 83-84 (1989).
154 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990). Hodgson was decided with another abortion regulation
case, Ohio v. Akron, 110 S. Ct. 2972 (1990) (Akron I). The Akron H case involved
issues very similar to Hodgson, thus an analysis of Hodgson may suffice to convey the
implications of both cases for purposes of this note.
155 This majority consisted ofJustice Stevens, who wrote the opinion for this portion of the case, Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice
O'Connor. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2930.
156 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144 (West 1988).
157 Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2930-32.
158 Id. at 2931 n.5. The Court noted that 27 states had similar statutes, but required the notification of only one parent or allowed exceptions to a requirement
of dual consent, while three states had statutes which were ambiguous as to
whether the notice to one parent was sufficient. Id. The Court contrasted the Minnesota statute with a similar provision in Arkansas, which required notice to both
parents but provided far more exceptions than the Minnesota statute. Id.
Subdivision 2 of the Minnesota statute did not provide for a judicial bypass
option. Id. at 2931-32. This section provided in part:
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Specifically, the provision required a minor to notify both parents
of her decision to abort at least forty-eight hours before the performance of the procedure, and provided only very limited exceptions.' 59 While recognizing the right of a state to require
minors to obtain parental notice or consent prior to an abortion,
the Court concluded that the requirement of notifying both par60
ents served no legitimate interest and was unconstitutional.

The majority reasoned that the justification of parental notice
statutes, i.e., to ensure a well-reasoned decision by the minor,
could be satisfied by notifying only one parent.' 6' Moreover, the
would be detrimenCourt noted that a dual-notification mandate
1 62
tal to minors in dysfunctional families.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 13.02, subdivision 8, no
abortion operation shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor
... until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending operation has been delivered in the manner specified in subdivisions 2 to 4.
(a) The notice shall be addressed to the parent at the usual place of
abode of the parent and delivered personally to the parent by the physician or an agent.
(b) In lieu of the delivery required by clause (a), notice shall be
made by certified mail addressed to the parent at the usual place of
abode of the parent with return receipt requested and restricted delivery to the addressee which means postal employees can only deliver
the mail to the authorized addressee. Time of delivery shall be
deemed to occur at 12 o'clock noon on the next day on which regular
mail delivery takes place, subsequent to mailing.
Id. at 2931 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343, subd. 2 (West 1988)). Subsection
6 of the statute provided the judicial bypass option as an alternative if subdivision 2
was ever " 'temporarily or permanently' enjoined by judicial order." Id. at 2932.
159 Id. at 2931-32. The statute provided exceptions only for situations in which
only one parent was alive, if the second parent could not be located after "reasonably diligent effort," for situations where emergency treatment was necessary to
prevent the death of the minor, or where the minor had advised the proper authorities that she was the victim of sexual or physical abuse. Id. No exception was provided for "a divorced parent, a noncustodial parent, or a biological parent who
never married or lived with the pregnant woman's mother." Id. at 2931.
160 Id. at 2944-45.
161 Id. at 2945.
162 Id. at 2945-46. The majority found that the testimony at trial had established
that the requirement of two-parent notification had proved harmful to minors in
dysfunctional families. Id. at 2945. The Court acknowledged the trial court had
determined that this provision often resulted in "major trauma" to the minor and
to her family and caused a violation of the privacy of both. Id.
The majority recognized that the statute's goal of creating full communication
among all family members was desirable, but instructed that the State may not
properly mandate such a goal. Id. at 2946. The Court noted that "[t]he State has
no more interest in requiring all family rwembers to talk with one another than it
has in requiring certain of them to live together." Id.
The Court also addressed the portion of the provision that required a minor to
wait forty-eight hours between the time of the notification and the performance of
the abortion procedure. Id. at 2944. The Court reasoned that this provision pro-
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The majority" 3 declared, however, that the judicial bypass
procedure's presence in subdivision six of the statute rendered
the two-parent notification requirement constitutional. 64 The
majority asserted that the bypass alternative fit within the framework established for such proceedings in Bellotti II, and that the
alternative was consistent with the precedents established
in
165
other cases concerning parental consent and notification.
duced only a minimal burden, and was justified by the interest in giving the parent
time to consult with the child and the physician. Id.
163 Justice Stevens dissented as to this portion of the decision, and therefore a
different majority was comprised for this part, consisting ofJustice Kennedy, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia. Id. at 2930.
164 Id. at 2971. Subdivision 6 of the statute provided in pertinent part:
If subdivision 2 of this law is ever temporarily or permanently restrained or enjoined by judicial order, subdivision 2 shall be enforced
as though the following paragraph were incorporated as paragraph (c)
of that subdivision; provided, however, that if such temporary or permanent restraining order of injunction is ever stayed or dissolved, or
otherwise ceases to have effect, subdivision 2 shall have full force and
effect, without being modified by the addition to the following substitute paragraph ... (c)(i) If such a pregnant woman elects not to allow
the notification of one or both of her parents or guardian or conservator, any judge of a court of competent jurisdiction shall, upon petition, or motion, and after an appropriate hearing, authorize a
physician to perform the abortion if said judge determines that the
pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving informed consent to
the proposed abortion. If said judge determines that the pregnant
woman is not mature, or if the pregnant woman does not claim to be
mature, the judge shall determine whether the performance of an
abortion upon her without notification of her parents, guardian, or
conservator would be in her best interests and shall authorize a physician to perform the abortion without such notification if said judge
concludes that the pregnant woman's best interests would be served
thereby.
Id. at 2933 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.343, subd. 6 (West 1988)).
165 Id. at 2970; see Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476, 491 (1983) ("It is clear, however, that 'the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently
mature to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an
abortion would be in her best interests.' ") (quoting Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 439-40 (1983)); Ohio v. Akron (Akron I/), 110
S. Ct. 2972, 2979-80 (1990). The Bellotti H plurality stated the criteria for a bypass
procedure in a consent statute:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either:
(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her
abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently
of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this
decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests. The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure
that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be
completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. In sum, the proce-
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Against this background of Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided Planned Parenthood v. Casey.' 66 In Casey, the Third
Circuit applied Justice O'Connor's undue burden standard to review several provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion Control
Act. 167 Examining the statute's provisions regarding a medical
emergency exception, and requirements of informed consent,
parental consent, spousal consent, and reporting and public disclosure, the court found that168only the spousal notice provision
presented an undue burden.

The 'rhird Circuit began its analysis by considering the standard of review to be applied, and emphasized that the proper
standard would determine the degree to which the state could
permissibly regulate abortions.' 69 The court explained that the
applicable standard of review depended upon whether a fundamental right was at issue. 170 The court noted that the existence
of a fundamental right to an abortion was the subject of continuous disagreement among the Supreme Court Justices.' 7' The
court acknowledged that a majority of the Supreme Court in Roe
had concluded that abortion was a fundamental right protected
by a strict scrutiny standard of review.' 72
dure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent does
not in fact amount to the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto" that
was found impermissible in Danforth.
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
Therefore the majority posited that the judicial bypass procedure was an effective "means of handling exceptions from a reasonable general rule, and thereby
[to] preserve the constitutionality of that rule .
Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2948.
166 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
167 Id. at 697. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-20 (1992).
168 Casey, 947 F.2d at 719. The court determined that the spousal notice requirement was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 715. See
id. at 699-719 for the court's analysis of all the provisions.
169 Id. at 687-88.
170 Id. at 688.
171 Id. at 688-89.
172 Id. at 688. Strict scrutiny is the standard the Supreme Court utilizes to review
a governmental regulation on a fundamental right. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
40, § 14.3. In order for the regulation to be valid, it must be shown that the regulation is designed to further a compelling governmental interest, and that the regulation "is necessary, or narrowly tailored, to promote that compelling interest." Id.
The court stated that this strict scrutiny standard was followed by most of the
Supreme Court's subsequent abortion decisions and, until recently, was considered
to be the controlling standard. Casey, 947 F.2d at 691, 697. For cases following
strict scrutiny analysis, see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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The court found, however, that two recent Supreme Court
cases altered that standard of review.' 73 The court recognized
that in Webster'

74

and Hodgson' 7 5 Justice O'Connor's somewhat

less stringent "undue burden" standard had replaced strict scrutiny as the controlling standard.' 76 The Third Circuit noted that
in Webster and Hodgson the strict scrutiny standard had been rejected by a majority of the Justices. 177 The appellate panel observed, however, that no new standard had commanded universal
support among the majority, 78 thus resulting in 79splintered decisions regarding which standard should control.'
In determining the controlling standard, the court of appeals
examined the United States Supreme Court decision in Marks v.
United States.' 80 The appellate panel claimed that the Marks Court
established that, in a fragmented decision where no opinion consists of a five justice majority, the opinion of the Justice concurring in the judgment on the narrowest grounds should be
considered the case's holding.' 8 '
Applying this reasoning to the Supreme Court's recent abortion decisions, the court of appeals found that no single standard
of review had been utilized by a majority of the Court in Webster
173

Casey, 947 F.2d at 694-95.

174 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
175 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
176 Casey, 947 F.2d at 697. The undue burden standard was based upon Justice
O'Connor's belief that abortion was a "limited" fundamental right. Id. at 688-89.
Therefore, under this standard, a regulation is given strict scrutiny if it "causes an
'undue burden' on a woman's abortion decision, and the rational basis standard if it
does not." Id.
The Third Circuit noted that in Webster and Hodgson the strict scrutiny standard
had been rejected by a majority of the justices. Id. at 695.
177 Id. at 695. The strict scrutiny standard commanded the allegiance of only
four dissenters in Webster, and three in Hodgson. Id. at 695-96.
178 Id. at 693.
179 Id. at 695. The court declared that in a case such as this, stare decisis mandated
a correct interpretation of which majority opinion had become the "law of the
land." Id. at 692.
180 Id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
181 Id. at 693. The court explained that this concept was a bit more difficult in an
opinion in which six or more Justices joined in the judgment and issued three or
more opinions. Id. at 694 n.7. In this case, the court reasoned that the commanding opinion was that of the "Justice or Justices who concurred on the narrowest
grounds necessary to secure a majority." Id. Thus, the court noted that "if threeJustices
issue[d] the broadest opinion, two Justices concur[red] on narrower grounds, and
one Justice concur[red] on still narrower grounds, the two-Justice opinion was
binding because that was the narrowest of the opinions necessary to secure a majority." Id. This standard, the court noted, would "necessarily produce results with
which a majority of the Court from that case would agree." Id. at 693.

284

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:255

and Hodgson.'8 2 The court reasoned that because Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in both cases represented the
narrowest grounds of adjudication, the Justice's undue burden
standard had become the law of the land. 18 3 Having established
that the applicable standard had changed from that used in previous abortion cases, the court held that results of those earlier
cases were therefore no longer binding on lower courts. 184 Thus,
85
the court deemed only Webster and Hodgson binding.1
The appeals panel next discussed the application of the undue burden standard to abortion regulations, and determined
that an undue burden only occurred when abortion regulations
either severely limited or banned pre-viability abortions, or
caused "a 'severe' or 'drastic' impact upon time, cost, or the
number of legal providers of abortions."186 The Third Circuit
indicated that an abortion regulation normally creates an undue
burden by giving a woman's husband, or a minor's parents, a
veto power over the abortion decision. 8 7 The court clarified,
however, that judicial bypass alternatives could remedy the undue burden 8 created by such notification and consent
1 8
regulations.
Turning to the Pennsylvania regulations at issue, the court
first considered the medical emergency exception. M The court
observed that the Act permitted the immediate termination of a
pregnancy posing a threat of death or significant and irreversible
damage to a major bodily function. 19 0 The court of appeals rejected the district court's finding that this definition was unconId. at 694-97.
Id. at 697.
Id. at 697-98.
Id.
186 Id. at 698 (quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490,
529-30 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
187 Id. at 699.
188 Id.
189 Id. Section 3203 of the Act defined a medical emergency as:
[T]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith
clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant
woman as to necessitate the immediate termination of her pregnancy
to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily function.
Id. (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3203 (1983 & Supp. 1991)).
190 Id. (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1983 & Supp. 1991). The court
determined that Roe and its progeny had established the fact that all regulations
that might "delay or prevent" an abortion must contain a medical emergency exception permitting a woman to obtain an abortion at any time during her pregnancy, without recourse to the regulations, when such an emergency arose. Id.
182
183
184
185
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stitutionally narrow.' 9 ' The court implied that the district court
had improperly based its decision on a speculative, worst-case
analysis 9 2 by assuming that three common pregnancy conditions, which created serious health risks to a woman, would not
fall within the medical emergency definition. 9 3 The court did
not dispute the fact that these conditions could lead to serious
bodily injury if a woman diagnosed with any one of them failed to
receive an abortion. 9 4 The court stressed, however, that Pennsylvania case law had instructed that the Commonwealth's statutes must be construed in favor of a constitutional
interpretation. 9 5 The court of appeals therefore recognized that
construing this provision in light of its goal of protecting the life
and health of women would lead to the conclusion that any pregnancy condition presenting a substantial risk to a woman's health
would fall within the medical emergency exception.'9 "
191 Id. at 698, 702. The district court found that the definition of medical emergency in the Pennsylvania Act was inadequate because it "interfered with the physician's independent medical judgment" and was "more restrictive than any other as
applied in medical situations." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323,
1377 (E.D. Pa. 1990). The district court judge determined that this definition could
cause a physician to act contrary to his own best medical judgment, as a situation
could arise that the physician felt necessitated an emergency abortion but which did
not fit within the Act's definition of emergency. Id.
192 Casey, 947 F.2d at 701 (quoting Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2981 (1990)). The court explained that the Supreme
Court recently applied this principle in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991),
where a similar provision was at issue. Id. The Third Circuit declared that Rust
involved a ban on abortion referrals, but this ban was not held to extend to emergency situations in which the woman's life was endangered. Id. The appeals panel
instructed that the Rust Court had rejected such an interpretation of the provision,
even though no medical emergency exception was explicitly contained in the statute, because in a facial challenge, " 'without any application ... to a specific fact
situation' it would not read the regulations to bar referral in such cases." Id. at
701-02 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1773 (1991)).
193 Id. at 701. The district court considered three common pregnancy conditions: preeclampsia, inevitable abortion, and prematurely ruptured membrane. Id.
The clinics argued that, while each of these conditions could pose a serious threat
to a woman's health if the pregnancy was not terminated, these conditions did not
cause an immediate risk of "substantial and irreversible impairment to a major bodily function," and thus were not within the Act's definition of a medical emergency.
Id. (citing Appellee's Brief at 6, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.
1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)).
194 Id. at 700.
195 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81 (1988); Hughes v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transportation, 523 A.2d 747 (1987); Frisby v. Shultz, 487
U.S. 474, 483 (1988); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 514
(1989)).
196 Id. at 701. The appeals panel also addressed a vagueness challenge to this
provision, which the district court had failed to consider. Id. at 702. The court
explained that, although the Act furnished civil and criminal sanctions for doctors
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The court of appeals next examined the informed consent
provision of the Act.' 9 7 Section 3205(a)(1) required a referring
who violated its provisions by performing a non-emergency abortion when it was
otherwise not permitted, the statute was not vague because it allowed the physician
to use his or her "good faith clinical judgment" in defining a medical emergency
exception. Id. The good faith standard, concluded the court, was clearly subjective,
requiring "a physician to violate his or her own good faith clinical judgment in
order to be criminally liable." Id. The court further provided that such a subjective
standard has consistently been upheld against vagueness challenges. Id. (citing U.S.
v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 69-72 (1971) (requirement that an abortion be "necessary
for the preservation of the mother's life or health" upheld against a vagueness challenge); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973) (statute requiring physician's
"best clinical judgment" regarding necessity for abortion not vague); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-97 (1979) (statute vague where it was unclear whether
a subjective or objective standard was to be used)).
197 Casey, 947 F.2d at 701. This provision was found in section 3205 of the Act,
which the court paraphrased, in pertinent part:
(a) GENERAL RULE - No abortion shall be performed or induced
except with the voluntary and informed consent of the woman upon
whom the abortion is to be performed or induced. Except in the case
of a medical emergency, consent to an abortion is voluntary and informed if and only if:
(1) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to
perform the abortion or the referring physician has orally informed
the woman of:
(i) The nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of
those risks and alternatives to the procedure or treatment that
a reasonable patient would consider material to the decision of
whether or not to undergo the abortion.
(ii) The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the
time the abortion is to be performed.
(iii) The medical risks associated with carrying her child to
term.

(2) At least 24 hours prior to the abortion, the physician who is to
perform the abortion or the referring physician, or a qualified physician assistant, health care practitioner, technician or social worker
to whom the responsibility has been delegated by either physician,
has informed the pregnant woman that:
(i) The [Pennsylvania] [D]epartment [of Health] publishes
printed materials which describe the unborn child and list
agencies which offer alternatives to abortion and that she has a
right to review the printed materials and that a copy will be
provided to her free of charge if she chooses to review it.
(ii) Medical assistance benefits may be available for prenatal
care, childbirth and neonatal care, and that more detailed information on the availability of such assistance is contained in
the printed materials published by the department.
(iii) The father of the unborn child is liable to assist in the
support of her child, even in instances where he has offered to
pay for the abortion. In the case of rape, this information may
be omitted.
(3) A copy of the printed material has been provided to the woman if she chooses to view these materials.
(4) The pregnant woman certifies in writing, prior to the abortion,
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or performing physician to inform the woman seeking the abortion of: (i) the nature and risks of the abortion procedure and
appropriate alternatives to it; (ii) the likely gestational age of the
fetus; and (iii) the risks involved in continuing the pregnancy to
term. 198 While acknowledging the possible resulting delays, increased costs, decreased availability, and the unfairness of compelling a woman to receive unsolicited information, the court
failed to recognize any of these burdens as undue.' 99 The court
determined that none of these effects would be drastic or severe. 00 Finding no undue burden, the court applied the rational-relation test. 20 ' The court easily identified a legitimate
state interest supporting the information requirements-fully informed abortion decisions.2 °2
Considering section 3205 (a)(2), which required the physician or a counselor to inform the woman of available assistance
benefits, possible abortion alternatives, the availability of printed
materials describing fetal development, and the obligation of the
child's father to assist in financial support, the court similarly
found no undue burden created.2 °3 The court determined that
any delay resulting from these provisions, which would increase
that the information required to be provided under paragraphs (1),
(2) and (3) has been provided.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
198 Casey, 947 F.2d at 703.
199 Id. at 703-04.
200 Id. at 703. The court found that any delay in the abortion procedure which
this provision would cause would only be minimal. Id. Similarly, the appeals panel
determined that the district court had not produced evidence of a significant increase in cost which would be likely to produce an "absolute obstacle" on the abortion right. Id. The court also asserted that this provision would "not cause abortion
providers to stop providing any or all abortions, and, accordingly ....
[would] not
cause a drastic or severe reduction in the availability of abortion." Id. Finally, the
court reasoned that mandating a woman to receive this information even if she has
not requested it was necessary for the woman to make a fully informed abortion
decision. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that this provision created no undue
burden. Id. at 704.
201 Id. at 703-04. The court explained that a statute will only be struck down
under the rational relation test if it is not "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." Id. at 689. The court called this a deferential standard, and noted that
"state legislation is rarely invalidated as not rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955); Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963)).
202 Id. at 704. Additionally, the court concluded that it was rational for the state
to require this information be conveyed by the physician rather than by a counselor, as a physician would be more qualified and more capable of providing relevant medical information. Id.
203 Id.
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costs and decrease availability, would be minimal. 20 4 Thus, the
court justified this section as furthering a legitimate interest in
the potential life of the fetus throughout all stages of
pregnancy.20 5
The final informed consent provision considered by the
Third Circuit was the requirement of a twenty-four hour waiting
period between the time the woman received the mandated information and the time that the abortion was performed.20 6
Although the court conceded that this waiting period was likely
to produce delays of over twenty-four hours, °7 the court did not
find the delay unduly burdensome.20 8 Analogizing to the Hodgson
case, the court pointed out that the Hodgson Court had approved
a judicial bypass procedure, finding no evidence indicating a possible delay of a week or more. 20 9 Applying the rational basis test,
the appellate court recognized the state's interest in ensuring
that women seeking abortions make a well-reasoned and well-informed decision.2 1 °
The court next addressed the parental consent provision in
Id. at 704-05.
Id. at 701. The court also addressed a First Amendment challenge which had
been brought by the clinics, who claimed that these informed consent provisions
violated the First Amendment by disseminating the Commonwealth's ideology that
childbirth was always preferable to abortion. Id. at 705. The court rejected this
idea, finding that this was commercial speech which was constitutionally permissible as long as it did not attempt to advocate a particular political, religious or nationalistic opinion. Id. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985)). Additionally, the court again stressed the legitimate interest the
state had in providing women with this particular information, which the court
noted was neither untrue nor unverifiable. Id. at 705-06.
206 Id. at 706.
207 Id. The court referred to the district court's findings, which had determined
that because most abortion clinics did not perform abortions every day, this twentyfour hour waiting period could actually result in delays of over twenty-four hours.
Id. The district court had calculated that in some cases the delay could be as long
as two weeks. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1378-79 (1990).
The district court also cautioned that the delay would cause women to make two
trips to an abortion clinic, thus increasing travel time and expenses and possibly
doubling a woman's subjection to harassment from demonstrators outside the clinics. Id.
208 Casey, 947 F.2d at 706-07.
209 Id. The district court also cited Hodgson when discussing this provision. Casey,
744 F. Supp. at 1379. The district court declared that Hodgson had validated a fortyeight hour waiting period for minors seeking abortions, but in doing so, had "explicitly distinguished the situation before it from that presented in Akron," which had invalidated a twenty-four hour waiting period for all women. Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, the district court attempted to demonstrate that such a provision would be
permissible for minors, but would create an undue burden for adult women. Id.
210 Casey, 947 F.2d at 707.
204
205
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section 3206.211 This section provided that a woman under the
age of eighteen must obtain the informed consent of at least one
parent or a guardian before receiving an abortion.212 The court
found the provision constitutionally permissible because it allowed a minor to receive judicial consent to an abortion.2 '3 The
court of appeals indicated that such a provision without a judicial
bypass option would unduly burden the minor's abortion decision by permitting a parent or guardian to have absolute veto
power over the minor's decision.21 4 The court found, however,
with the requirements
that a judicial bypass option21comporting
enunciated in Bellotti v. Baird 5 (Bellotti H) cured the undue burden.216 The court observed that Pennsylvania's Act complied
with the Bellotti II requirements by: (i) allowing a minor to petition the court for a determination that she was mature enough to
make her decision without parental consent, or that she was not
211

Id. at 707-09. This section provided in pertinent part:
(a) GENERAL RULE - Except in the case of a medical emergency, or
except as provided in this section, if a pregnant woman is less than 18
years of age and not emancipated, or if she had been adjudged an
incompetent ... , a physician shall not perform an abortion upon her
unless, in the case of a woman who is less than 18 years of age, he first
obtains the informed consent both of the pregnant woman and of one
of her parents; or, in the case of a woman who is incompetent, he first
obtains the informed consent of her guardian.

(c) PETITION TO THE COURT FOR CONSENT - If both of the
parents or guardians of the pregnant woman refuse to consent to the
performance of an abortion or if she elects not to seek the consent of
either of her parents or of her guardian, the court of common pleas of
the judicial district in which the applicant resides or in which the abortion is sought shall, upon petition or motion, after an appropriate
hearing, authorize a physician to perform the abortion if the court
determines that the pregnant woman is mature and capable of giving
informed consent to the proposed abortion, and has, in fact, given
such consent.
(d) COURT ORDER - If the court determines that the pregnant woman is not mature and capable of giving informed consent or if the
pregnant woman does not claim to be mature and capable of giving
informed consent, the court shall determine whether the performance
of an abortion upon her would be in her best interests. If the court
determines that the performance of an abortion would be in the best
interests of the woman, it shall authorize a physician to perform the
abortion.
Id. (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (1983 & Supp. 1991)).
212 Id. at 707.
213

Id. at 708.

214

Id.

215

443 U.S. 622 (1979). See supra notes 69-77 for an analysis of Bellotti II.
Casey, 947 F.2d at 708-09.

216
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mature, but an abortion was in her best interests; (ii) mandating
that these hearings and any appeals be prompt; and
(iii) requiring that the proceedings be confidential.2 17 Accordingly, the court validated the provision and justified the state's
rational attempt to ensure that minors fully understand the implications of an abortion.2 18
The court found the spousal notice provision in section
3209, however, to be somewhat more problematic.2 '9 The Third
Circuit explained that this section required a married woman to
give her physician a signed statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intent to abort. 22 0 The court listed four
exceptions to the spousal notice requirement: (i) the husband
was not the father of the child; (ii) diligent efforts failed to locate
the husband; (iii) the pregnancy resulted from sexual abuse from
the husband which had been reported to a law enforcement
agency; or (iv) the woman feared that notifying her husband
would be likely to cause physical abuse by either the husband or
Id. at 709. See Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. at 642-44.
Casey, 947 F.2d at 709.
Id. Section 3209 stated in pertinent part:
(a) SPOUSAL NOTICE REQUIRED - In order to further the Commonwealth's interest in promoting the integrity of the marital relationship and to protect a spouse's interests in having children within
marriage and in protecting the prenatal life of that spouse's child, no
physician shall perform an abortion on a married woman, except as
provided in subsections (b) and (c), unless he or she has received a
signed statement, which need not be notarized, from the woman upon
whom the abortion is to be performed, that she has notified her
spouse that she is about to undergo an abortion. The statement shall
bear a notice that any false statement made therein is punishable by
law.
(b) EXCEPTIONS - The statement certifying that the notice required by subsection (a) has been given need not be furnished where
the woman provided the physician a signed statement certifying at
least one of the following:
(1) Her spouse is not the father of the child.
(2) Her spouse, after diligent effort, could not be located.
(3) The pregnancy is a result of spousal sexual assault . . . which
has been reported to a law enforcement agency having the requisite
jurisdiction.
(4) The woman has reason to believe that the furnishing of notice
to her spouse is likely to result in the infliction of bodily injury upon
her by her spouse or by another individual. Such statements need
not be notarized, but shall bear a notice that any false statements
made therein are punishable by law.
Id. (citing 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1983 & Supp. 1991)).
220 Casey, 947 F.2d at 709. The court noted that the Commonwealth was required
to provide forms for this statement, which contained a warning that any false statements were punishable by law. Id.
217
218
219
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another. 22 ' The court concluded that despite the exceptions, this
section created an undue burden on the woman's abortion
decision.2 22
The court stressed that only the effects upon the woman
should be considered, not the countervailing interests of the husband. 223 Thus, the court determined that this provision would

impose severe limits on a woman's abortion decision, because the
husband could penalize the woman for her choice. 224 The court

enumerated the possible consequences of requiring spousal notification, including physical or economic force by the husband to
prevent the wife from obtaining an abortion, psychological coercion, or the inhibition of a woman's unrestrained choice due to
the feared reaction of her husband.22 5 The court of appeals recognized that even the exceptions that Pennsylvania provided
could not remedy the undue burden, because they did not adequately address all the reasonably predictable burdens.226
Therefore, the court concluded that the spousal notice provision
would be likely to dissuade many women from seeking abortions,
227
and thus found it necessary to apply the strict scrutiny test.
Although the court considered the husband's interests in ap228
plying the strict scrutiny test, it found none to be compelling.
The court identified three state interests, but did not find any
compelling. 229 The court found the state's interest in promoting
221
222
223
224

Id. at 709-10.
Id. at 713.
Id. at 710.
Id.

225 Id. at 712. The psychological coercion mentioned by the court included
threats by the husband to dissolve the marriage or to disclose the wife's abortion
decision to family or friends. Id.
226 Id. at 712-13. The court found that the exception for a woman who reasonably believed that notifying her husband would result in bodily injury to her did not
consider battered wives. Id. The court stated that the district court had concluded,
with sufficient evidence, "that battered spouses are psychologically incapacitated
from making the assertion required by the statute even when there is ample objective evidence for the required fear." Id. at 713. Additionally, the court noted that
this exception may not include women who have never before been victims of physical abuse by their husbands, but feared that this notification could occasion a violent outburst. Id.
The court also discussed the exception for a woman whose pregnancy was the
result of sexual abuse by her husband. Observing that this exception would only
come into effect if the woman had reported her husband to law enforcement authorities, the court found this to be an unreasonable prerequisite, as it could have
"devastating effects" on the marital relationship. Id. at 713.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 714-15.
229 Id. at 713-15.
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marital integrity to be somewhat ambiguous. 230 The court of appeals reasoned that if marital integrity meant honesty and full
disclosure between a husband and wife, the interest was less than
legitimate. 2 3' Alternatively, the court concluded that a Commonwealth interest in marital integrity, intended to preserve marital
harmony, was legitimate but not compelling, and was not served
by a narrowly-tailored regulation.2 3 2
The Third Circuit reasoned that it could consolidate the
state's second interest in furthering the husband's interest in having children within marriage with the state's third interest in protecting fetal life.2 3 The court deemed the husband's right to the
fetus legitimate but not compelling. 234 The court declared that
the wife's right to an abortion was always paramount to the
state's interest in protecting the husband's right to the fetus.2 3 5
Accordingly, the court invalidated the spousal notice requirement because the requirement placed an undue burden upon the
woman's abortion decision that was not justified by a compelling
236
state interest.
The Third Circuit next considered the confidential reporting
requirements of section 3214 of the Act.23 7 The court first clariId. at 714.
Id. The court explained that in Hodgson, a similar interest in familial integrity
had been deemed an intrusion into the "private realm of family life," and thus not a
legitimate state interest. Id. (quoting Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2946).
232 Id. The court added, however, that even if this were a compelling interest, the
section was not narrowly tailored to further it, as there was no proof that the required disclosure would "save more marriages than it destroy[ed]." Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 714-15.
235 Id. Because the woman's abortion right was grounded in the right of privacy,
the court noted, she was "constitutionally privileged" to make her decision free of
interference from anyone else, including her husband. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70
n.ll (1976)).
236 Id. at 715.
237 Id. at 715-19. The relevant portions of this section are:
(a) GENERAL RULE - For the purpose of promotion of maternal
health and life by adding to the sum of medical and public health
knowledge through the compilation of relevant data, and to promote
the Commonwealth's interest in protection of the unborn child, a report of each abortion performed shall be made to the department on
forms prescribed by it. The report forms shall not identify the individual patient by name and shall include the following information:
(1) Identification of the physician who performed the abortion,
the concurring physician ... , the second physician ... , and the
facility where the abortion was performed and of the referring physician, agency or service, if any.
(2) The county and state in which the woman resides.
230
231
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fled that reporting requirements had been deemed constitutionally permissible in the abortion context, as long as the reports
were kept confidential and did not attempt to impose, through
the sheer burden of recordkeeping detail, an unconstitutional restriction. 238 The court then addressed section 3214's four specific disclosure requirements, which the district court had found
unconstitutional.2 39 These requirements involved provisions regarding the basis of the physician's decision as to gestational age,
the necessity for a third trimester abortion, the presence of a
medical emergency, and the identity of the referring physician.240
The court of appeals declared that these disclosure requirements did not create an undue burden. 24 ' The court remarked
that the district court had determined that the reporting of this
information would increase the cost of every abortion by only a
few dollars - an insufficient increase to constitute an undue burden.2 4 2 The court also stressed that adequate safeguards maintaining the confidentiality of the reports protected against public
disclosure of sensitive information, and did not create an undue
(3) The woman's age.
(4) The number of prior pregnancies and prior abortions of the
woman.
(5) The gestational age of the unborn child at the time of the
abortion.
(6) The type of procedure performed or prescribed and the date
of the abortion.
(7) Pre-existing medical conditions of the woman which would
complicate the pregnancy, if any, and if known, any medical complication which resulted from the abortion itself.
(8) The basis for the medical judgment of the physician who performed the abortion that the abortion was necessary to prevent
either the death of the pregnant woman or the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the woman,
where an abortion has been performed pursuant to section
321 l(b)(l)....
(10) Basis for any medical judgment that a medical emergency existed which excused the physician from compliance with any provision of this chapter.
Id. at 715 n.28 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214 (a) (i) (1983 & Supp.
1991)).
238 Casey, 947 F.2d at 716 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
81 (1976)).
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 716-17.
242 Id. at 716. Specifically, the district court had found that by requiring this information to be disclosed in a report for every abortion would cost "$12,000 per
year for an abortion clinic that performed 7,000 abortions per year," which
amounted to an increase of only a few dollars per abortion. Id.
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burden. 243 The court then determined that these reporting re-

quirements were rationally related to Pennsylvania's interest in
obtaining important statistics about abortions and ensuring that
doctors and clinics were complying with the Act.2 4 4
The court of appeals rejected the district court's view that
the required inclusion of the referring physician's name in the
report would cause many physicians to stop referring women for
abortions.245 The court concluded that procedural mechanisms
safeguarding the confidentiality of the reports made that result
unlikely.246 Accordingly, the court found no undue burden present in the reporting requirement.24 7
Finally, the court examined section 3207(b), which required
every publicly funded abortion facility to file a report containing
the number of abortions performed during each trimester.248
243 Id. The court noted that Thornburgh had invalidated similar provisions, determining that an undue burden was created because of the lack of confidentiality of
these reports. Id. at 716 n.29.
244 Id. at 716-17. The court rejected the district court's opinion that these provisions would create a "chilling effect" upon the physician's exercise of his or her
judgment, finding no support for this assertion. Id. at 717.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. Additionally, the Court reasoned that the referring physician could perform some of the Act's requirements, such as obtaining the woman's informed consent and determining gestational age. Id. The court opined that the district court
had overlooked these facts in making its determination that the state had no interest in clarifying any information the referring physician might provide. Id.
248 Id. at 717-18. Section 3207(b) provided:
Within 30 days after the effective date of this chapter, every facility at
which abortions are performed shall file, and update immediately
upon any change, a report with the department, which shall be open
to public inspection and copying, containing the following information:
(1) Name and address of the facility.
(2) Name and address of any parent, subsidiary or affiliated organizations, corporations or associations.
(3) Name and address of any parent, subsidiary or affiliated organizations, corporations or associations having contemporaneous
commonality of ownership, beneficial interest, directorship or officership with any other facility.
The information contained in those reports which are filed pursuant
to this subsection by facilities which receive State appropriated funds
during the 12-calendar-month period immediately preceding a request to inspect a copy of such reports shall be deemed public information. Reports filed by facilities which do not receive State
appropriated funds shall only be available to law enforcement officials, the State Board of Medicine and the State Board of Osteopathic
Medicine for use in the performance of their official duties. Any facility failing to comply with the provisions of this subsection shall be
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The appeals panel refuted the district court's determination that
the provision would unduly burden the abortion right by increasing the amount of protests occurring in front of the abortion clinics and eventually reducing the number of abortion providers.24 9
The court of appeals acknowledged the substantial amount of
protests occurring in front of abortion clinics, but concluded that
the district court had failed to demonstrate a clear nexus between
the reporting requirement and either increased private harassment or the existence of an undue burden. 250 The court also rejected the argument that this provision placed ' 25
an
"unconstitutional condition on the receipt of public funds." 1
The court stated that such a claim required the implication of a
constitutional right warranting strict scrutiny review.

252

The

court concluded, however, that no unconstitutional condition
could be found because strict scrutiny was not invoked in the absence of an undue burden. 25" The court thus determined this
provision to be constitutionally permissible, recognizing that
Pennsylvania had a legitimate state interest in informing its taxpayers how the state allocated their funds.254
In a separate opinion, Judge Alito dissented from the court's
invalidation of the spousal notification requirement.255 Judge Alito joined in the remainder of the court's opinion, except the
court's interpretation that a two-parent notification requirement
without a judicial bypass was subject to strict scrutiny because it
imposed an undue burden.256
assessed by the department a fine of $500 for each day it is in violation hereof.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3207(b) (1983 & Supp. 1991)).
249 Casey, 947 F.2d at 717.
250 Id. at 718 (citing American College of Obstetricians v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d
283, 297-98 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)). The court
noted that it first enunciated this standard in Thornburgh in which virtually the same
reporting requirement was considered. Id. The court noted that most of the clinics
encountered protests without the public disclosure requirement, and that the clinics were publicly listed and advertised in the phone book. Id.
251 Id. The court explained that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prohibits the government from conditioning the grant of a governmental benefit upon
the surrender of a constitutional right. Id. at 718-19 (citing Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1989)).
252 Id. at 719.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 718. The court also noted that this was consistent with Pennsylvania's
practice of making records of public expenditures and disbursements publicly available. Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 719 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Judge Alito agreed with the majority's conclusion that Webster and Hodgson had changed the controlling standard in abortion
cases to that of Justice O'Connor's undue burden test.257 The
judge disagreed with the majority only concerning which prong
of the test should be applied.258 Judge Alito posited that no undue burden existed, and therefore suggested that the appellate
court should have applied the rational-relation test to the spousal
notification provision.2 59
Judge Alito asserted that Justice O'Connor had defined what
constituted an undue burden in numerous abortion decisions.26 °
The judge noted that Justice O'Connor often held that no undue
burden was created by parental notification statutes, even when
two-parent notice with a judicial bypass option was mandated. 26 '
Judge Alito remarked that Justice O'Connor made these conclusions despite evidence that these provisions either would substantially inhibit many minors from choosing abortions, or would
result in many of the same harms that the majority attributed to
the Pennsylvania statute's spousal notice provision.262 The judge
also found that Justice O'Connor declined to find an undue burden imposed by regulations increasing or even doubling the cost
of abortions.2 63 Surveying Justice O'Connor's abortion opinions,
Id. at 720 (Alito, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. According to Judge Alito, Justice O'Connor consistently concluded that
an undue burden resulted from "absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the
abortion decision," or when another person had an absolute veto power over the
woman's abortion decision. Id. (quoting Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 464 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). The judge emphasized, however, that Justice O'Connor's opinions cautioned that an undue burden
was not created when a regulation merely inhibited abortions in some way or when a
regulation caused only some women to be less likely to choose an abortion. Id. at
720-21 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 829 (1986)).
261 Id. at 721 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2950-51 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398
(1981)).
262 Id. In Matheson, Justice Marshall, dissenting, argued that the statute requiring
parental notice for minors prior to any abortion could result in "physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support or actual obstruction of the abortion
decision." H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 398 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
These are similar consequences to those that the majority concluded would result
from Pennsylvania's spousal notice provision. Casey, 947 F.2d at 707-12. The majority found that the spousal notice requirement would be likely to cause a husband
to use physical or economic force against the wife, psychological coercion or other
means to prevent his wife from obtaining an abortion. Id. at 712.
263 Casey, 947 F.2d at 721. (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
257
258
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Judge Alito acknowledged that the Justice never found an undue
burden in regulations that inhibited only marginally a woman's
abortion decision.264 Thus, the dissent concluded that to impose
an undue burden, a regulation would have to severely and
broadly limit abortions.265
Having interpreted Justice O'Connor's undue burden standard, Judge Alito declared that the evidence failed to show that
the spousal notification requirement in section 3209 imposed an
undue burden. 266 The judge found no broad inhibiting effect

resulting from this provision.26 7 Judge Alito reasoned that because the record indicated that section 3209 was likely only to
inhibit abortions to some degree, and did not demonstrate that
the consequences would be greater than those recognized by
Id.
Id.
266 Id. at 721-22 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Alito
referred to Justice O'Connor's opinion in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). Id. at 722 n.2 (Alito,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Alito explained Justice O'Connor had
emphasized in Thornburgh that "a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute
must bear the burden of proving that the law imposes an undue burden." Id. (citing
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 827). The judge stated the plaintiffs failed to meet that
burden of proof. Id. at 722 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
267 Id. at 722 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Alito
noted that the district court posited that because most married women voluntarily
notified their husbands before seeking abortions and the majority of abortions are
sought by unmarriedwomen, section 3209 would affect few women. Id. (concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp.
1323, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1990)). The judge continued that this number of adversely
affected women would be reduced by application of the four exceptions. The
spousal notice provision excepted a woman from notifying her husband if: (1) the
woman's husband was not the father of the child; (2) her husband could not be
located after she had made a diligent effort to find him; (3) the pregnancy resulted
from sexual abuse from the husband, which had been reported to a law-enforcement agency; or (4) the woman feared that notifying her husband would be likely to
cause her physical abuse by her husband or by another. Id. at 709-10 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, Judge Alito suggested that
the affected group could be narrowed further by assuming that some women would
overcome their initial disinclination to notify their husbands. Id. at 722-23 (Alito,J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The judge noted, however, that the
plaintiffs had ignored these possibilities and failed to produce evidence showing
how many women would actually be harmed by section 3209. Id. The dissent also
noted that this provision would not give a husband "veto power" over his wife's
abortion decision. Id. This point was in accord with the majority's holding. Id. at
710. The majority found, however, that an undue burden was created by this provision because it would severely limit the woman's abortion decision. Id. at 713.
Thus, the majority determined that this notification requirement, while not giving
the husband a veto power, could permit the husband to prevent his wife's abortion
in other ways, such as by psychological coercion or by threatening to dissolve the
marriage. Id. at 710-12.
264
265
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provisions that Justice O'Connor had validated, section 3209 did
not create an undue burden. 268 Thejudge recognized the potentially grave consequences of section 3209, but cautioned that the
court should defer to the legislature in addressing these
consequences .269
Finding no undue burden, Judge Alito reasoned that section
3209 need only be shown to further a legitimate state interest,
under the rational-relation test. 27 0 The judge agreed with the
majority that the state had a legitimate
interest in protecting the
husband's interest in the fetus. 2 7 1 After recognizing the state's
Id. at 723 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 723-24. (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Alito
asserted that the legislature had anticipated such consequences and had attempted
to remedy them by including the four exceptions in the section. Id. at 724 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Noting Justice O'Connor's opinion in Hodgson, the judge rejected the majority's interpretation that Justice O'Connor ruled that the two-parent notification
statute presented an undue burden with no compelling state interest. Id. Instead,
the judge argued that Justice O'Connor held the provision unconstitutional for a
lack of a reasonably related and legitimate state interest. Id. Acknowledging that
Justice O'Connor had joined in most ofJustice Stevens's lead opinion in Hodgson,
Judge Alito analyzed Justice Stevens's opinion when interpreting Justice
O'Connor's decision. Id. Judge Alito pointed out thatJustice Stevens did not apply
or even discuss strict scrutiny. Id. Instead, the judge asserted, Justice Stevens had
used the lenient rational relation test in finding an undue burden. Id.; see Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2937 (1990). Moreover, Judge Alito noted that part
VII ofJustice Stevens's opinion was dedicated to an explanation of the provision's
failure under the rational relation test. Casey, 947 F.2d at 724 (Alito, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Judge Alito found this to be clear support for the
fact that Justice Stevens did not employ strict scrutiny in his analysis. Id.
Judge Alito opined that Justice O'Connor employed the same level of scrutiny
in Hodgson. Id. Although the judge recognized that Justice O'Connor had not
joined in the portion of Justice Stevens's discussion of the applicable standard,
Judge Alito analyzed Justice O'Connor's language and concluded that the Justice
agreed with Justice Stevens's use of the rational relation test. Id. Judge Alito
quoted a portion ofJustice O'Connor's opinion, which stated: "I agree with Justice
Stevens' statement that the statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it imposes
are not reasonably related to legitimate state interests." Id. (quoting Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2949-50 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Additionally, the judge emphasized that Justice O'Connor joined part VII of
Justice Stevens's opinion discussing the statute's failure to satisfy a legitimate state
interest. Id. at 724-25 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge
Alito therefore postulated thatJustice O'Connor would not have joined in that portion of the opinion if the Justice favored a different standard. Id. at 725 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). ThusJudge Alito concluded thatJustice
O'Connor's opinion could not be read to mean that she found an undue burden
under strict scrutiny analysis. Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. (citing id. at 715-16). The majority had admitted that this interest was
legitimate but not compelling, the level necessary to satisfy the strict scrutiny test
they applied. Id. Judge Alito cited Supreme Court cases which had found a funda268
269

19921

NOTE

299

legitimate interest, Judge Alito asserted that the abortion issue,
as other matters regarding domestic relations, fell within the
"virtually exclusive province of the States.

' 27 2

Therefore, the

judge considered whether the provision was rationally related to
that interest. 2 73 Judge Alito instructed that a state statute must

not be invalidated because of a court's belief that it is "inartfully
ht275
drawn, "1274 or that
it produces some adverse consequences.
Rather, the judge stressed that only a clear showing of statutory
arbitrariness and irrationality could overcome the provision's
"presumption of rationality. "276
The judge concluded that the provision was rationally related to the state's interest because some married women might
seek an abortion without notifying their husbands, therefore infringing the husband's rights in the fetus.277 Accordingly, Judge
Alito declared that because the plaintiffs had shown nothing
more than mere disagreement on the wisdom of this statute, and
had failed to demonstrate the irrationality or arbitrariness of the
statute, the court could not overrule the legislature.278
The Third Circuit's majority opinion proved to be an accurate barometer of the case's final resolution by the Supreme
Court. 79 In a joint opinion, the Court affirmed the Third Circuit's ruling on every challenged regulation, while espousing and
crystallizing the "undue burden" standard as the relevant test in
abortion cases. 280 The Court also chose this opportunity to reaffirm the central holding of Roe v. Wade. 2 8 l In the Court's divisive
review of Casey, five Justices expressed varying rationales for their
decision to reaffirm 2 8 2 while the remaining four Justices unmental interest in protecting the man's right to father a child and in the welfare of a
child that a father will assist in raising. Id. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 123 (1989); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1969); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)). Based on these decisions, the judge reasoned "that a husband has a 'legitimate' interest in the welfare
of a fetus he has conceived with his wife." Id. at 725-26.
272 Id. at 726. (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting U.S.
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178 (1981)).
273 Id.
274 Id. (quoting U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175
(1981)).
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 726-27 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
279 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
280 Id. at 2819, 2821-33.
281 Id. at 2804.
282 See id. at 2803, 2838, 2843.
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3

Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, authoring the joint
opinion, began their analysis with a dictum-filled defense of
Roe. 2 8 4 The Justices next recognized three sections as comprising Roe's essential holding.285 First, the Court recognized a woman's right to an abortion at any time before fetal viability
without undue interference from the government.286 Second,
the Justices confirmed the states' ability to restrict abortions once
the fetus has reached viability.287 Finally, Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter maintained that the state had an interest in
protecting the life of the mother and the fetus throughout
pregnancy. 218
Having delineated Roe's central framework, the Court justified Roe's reaffirmance on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process component. 2 89 The Justices

observed the Court's history of protecting certain liberty rights
from governmental intrusion, regardless of whether those rights
are enumerated in the Constitution itself.290 Acknowledging the
283 See id. at 2855, 2873. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia and
Thomas advocated reversing Roe. Id.
284 Id. at 2804. Opining "[Iliberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt,"
the Justices seemed to admonish the federal government by noting that Casey was
the sixth case in the past decade in which the United States had submitted an amicus
curiaebrief urging Roe's overturn. Id. at 2803. The Justices asserted that Roe's progeny had clouded the meaning and scope of the case's holding, therefore requiring a
reaffirmance and restatement of that decision. Id. at 2804.

285

Id.

Id. The Court opined that the state interest in the fetus was not strong
enough before viability to allow the state to either proscribe abortion or impose
"substantial obstacle[s]" to impede a woman's choice. Id. Later in the opinion the
Court used this "substantial obstacle" language as a cornerstone of its "undue burden" standard. Id. at 2820.
287 Id. at 2804. The Court pointed out that such restrictions would have to contain exceptions for women whose health would be jeopardized if forced to carry the
fetus to term. Id.
286

288

Id.

Id. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that states cannot "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, Sec. 1.
290 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805. The Court cited Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95
(1987) (upholding prisoners' constitutional right to marry); Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (upholding contraception as a
constitutionally protected right); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (the right to marital privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment protects the use of contraception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (upholding parents' liberty to direct the education and raising of
their children). Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805.
289
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difficulty of determining what rights should be deemed fundamental, the Court decided that reasoned judgment should suffice. 29 ' Thus, by noting the constitutional protections given to

certain personal. decisions creating a realm of privacy,292 the
Court explained that Roe fell within the line of cases making the
use of contraception a fundamental right.2 93
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter buttressed the reaffirmance of Roe with a detailed dissertation on the importance of
stare decisis. 294 According to the Justices, when deciding whether
to overrule a past holding, the Court must consider a number of
questions concerning the benefits and detriments of abandoning
past precedent. 295 The Court considered several issues, including whether Roe had proven unworkable, whether its holding had
been relied on to the point where overruling it would inflict hardship on people's lives, whether legal principles had advanced so
as to leave Roe doctrinally incorrect, and whether the case's factual underpinnings had drastically changed.296
The Justices succinctly stated that Roe had not proven unworkable because the holding represented a mere limitation on a
state's power to regulate abortion.297 While conceding that Roe
had required, and would continue to require, judicial review to
determine if a state regulation exceeded Roe's constraints, the
Court reiterated that such review was within the purview ofjudicial competence.29 8
291 Id. at 2806. The Justices said that "reasoned judgment" did not allow the
judiciary to use subjective opinions, but called upon Justices to reasonably apply
the law. Id. Justice Scalia, however, argued that the joint opinion was based on
"personal predilection," not reasoned judgment. Id. at 2876 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
292 Id. at 2807. See e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing
a right of privacy in the area of reproductive planning which cannot be unjustifiably
intruded upon by the government); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (recognizing a zone of privacy surrounding the family which the government
cannot infringe upon).
293 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-08. For cases upholding contraception as a fundamental right, see Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(right to contraception protected by Fourteenth Amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending right to use contraception to unmarried individuals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception protected by
right to marital privacy).
294 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808. Stare decisis is defined: "To abide by, or adhere to,
decided cases." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
295 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808.
296 Id. at 2809 (citations omitted).
297 Id. (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528, 546 (1985)).
298 Id.
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The Court next maintained that members of the general
public had organized their lives and intimate relationships for
nearly two decades in reliance on Roe's protection of abortion. 9
Equating a woman's ability to make reproductive decisions with
the ability to be an equal participant in society, the Justices declared that overruling Roe would detrimentally affect society.3 0°
The Court continued its stare decisis analysis by asserting that
no changes had been wrought to the legal principles supporting
Roe's main doctrine.3"' The Justices posited that the Roe Court
had placed its decision in the line of cases involving the family,
procreation, and intimate relationships. 0 2 Because the decisions
in this area had not been disturbed, the Justices determined, the
legal principles upon which Roe was premised had not undergone
a metamorphosis. 0 3 Similarly, the Court observed that cases
protecting personal autonomy and bodily integrity, which might
be argued as the basis of Roe, had not been questioned. 04 Finally, the Justices stated that if Roe was to be considered sui
generis,3 5 then the Court's continued reaffirmance of Roe evidenced the holding's correctness. 0 6
Addressing the question of whether the factual underpinnings of Roe had changed enough to render the decision unjusti299 Id. The Court acknowledged that this reliance could not be proven, but
stated that the "certain cost" of overruling Roe could not be measured either. Id.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, however, noted that the record contained no proof of any
reliance on Roe that could not be rectified by reproductive planning. Id. at 2862
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra notes 385-425
and accompanying text for discussion of the Chief Justice's opinion.
300 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2862.
301 Id. at 2810.
302 Id. This line of cases includes: Carey v. Population Services International,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) (protecting the use of contraception); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (subjecting regulations regarding "family living arrangements" to careful examination); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(protecting the use of contraception).
303 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810.
304 Id. (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905)).
305 Suigeneris is defined: "Of its own kind or class; i.e. the only one of its own kind;
peculiar." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990).
306 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2810. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Roe expressly affirmed by five Justices); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(Roe expressly affirmed by six Justices). Justice O'Connor also noted the ambiguous affirmance of Roe in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (majority ofJustices either expressly affirmed or refused to discuss the constitutionality of Roe).
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fiable, the Court acknowledged that changes had occurred, but
not to the extent of weakening the Roe mandate.3 °7 The Court
noted that maternal health care and neonatal care advances allowed for safer abortions and earlier fetal viability than in
1973.308 The opinion rationalized that these factual changes
merely affected the time frame in which abortions could be performed. 3 9 Therefore, the Justices stressed, Roe's viability standard remained unchanged. 1 0
Recognizing the heated national debate surrounding the
abortion issue, the Justices next compared the decision to uphold
Roe with two similarly controversial cases. 3 ' First, the Court focused on Lochner v. New York, 3 2 which declared contractual freedom to be a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 1 3 The Justices noted that Lochner was subsequently
overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish3 4 because Lochner's
theory of laissez faire economics hindered governmental attempts to improve human welfare.31 5 Second, the Court considered Plessy v. Ferguson,3 1 6 which upheld racial segregation as
constitutionally permissible. 7 The Justices observed that Plessy
was overruled by Brown v. Board of Education3 1 8 because of advances in the social sciences proving that segregation had the efCasey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811-12.
Id. at 2811. The Court pointed out that fetal viability had occurred at approximately twenty-eight weeks in 1973 when Roe was decided, and nearly twenty years
later was in the twenty-three to twenty-four week range. Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 2811-12.
311 Id. at 2812.
312 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
313 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812. In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York law
limiting the number of hours a bakery employee could work per week. Lochner, 198
U.S. at 64. The Court ruled that the employee's liberty to contract overrode the
State's health related goals. Id. at 57-58. The majority disregarded ample evidence
that long hours directly impacted on employee's health. Id. at 70-72. (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
314 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
315 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812. In West Coast, the Court upheld minimum wage
requirements for women as a legitimate means of improving worker's economic
bargaining power. West Coast, 300 U.S. at 400. The West Coast Court implied that
Lochner's view of contractual liberty failed to protect workers from oppressive conditions created by their weak bargaining position. Id.
316 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
317 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813. In Plessy, the Court held that racial segregation did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-52. The Court
rejected arguments that segregation had detrimental psychological effects on
Blacks. Id. at 551.
318 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
307
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fect of branding minority groups as inferior.3 1 9
According to Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, the
decisions in West Coast and Brown were based on new understandings of previously misinterpreted facts. 320 The Justices emphasized that these changed circumstances made the West Coast and
Brown decisions understandable to the general public and, therefore, defensible. 32 ' Reasserting that neither the factual under-

pinnings nor the legal justification of Roe had been similarly
transformed, the Court concluded that Roe's reversal would
merely be the result of doctrinal preferences rather than the application of constitutional law principles.32 2 Such a result, the
Justices concluded, would strike a serious blow to the Court's legitimacy because the public would perceive the decision as
grounded in political considerations rather than judicial
review. 23
The Justices next considered the appropriate standard for
determining the constitutionality of state abortion restrictions. 24
The Justices rejected Roe's rigid trimester framework as undervaluing the state interest in potential life from the moment of
conception. 25 Particularly, the Court rejected cases that interpreted Roe as requiring strict scrutiny of all state regulations on
first trimester abortions.326 Instead, the Justices opined, a woman's right to have an abortion does not prohibit the state from
319 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813. In Brown, the Court ruled that racially segregated
schools were violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. The
Court relied on data which proved that the psychological effects of segregation
made the practice inherently unequal. Id. at 494-95.
320 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813. See supra notes 315 and 319 for discussion of these
misinterpreted facts.
321 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2813.
322 Id. at 2813-14.
323 Id. at 2814. The Justices asserted:
[T]he Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money
and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a
product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's
acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law
means and to declare what it demands.
Id.
324 Id. at 2816.
325 Id. at 2817. The Court noted that the Roe opinion expressly established the
State's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life." Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
326 Id. Strict scrutiny review requires the state law to be narrowly drawn to further a compelling interest. Id. The Court cited Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983), as an example of a case that wrongly
applied strict scrutiny analysis to a state abortion decison. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
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enacting legislation aimed at informing her decision. 2 7 The
mere fact that such legislation could make the abortion right
more difficult to exercise, the Justices continued, did not necessarily render it constitutionally infirm. 28
Against this backdrop, the Court articulated the undue burden analysis as the proper approach in abortion cases. 3 29 The

Justices declared that the undue burden standard compelled the
Court to uphold the pre-viability abortion restrictions unless the
restrictions unduly burdened a woman's decision to terminate a
pregnancy.330 The Justices then defined an undue burden as a
"substantial obstacle" to a woman's right to choose, which either
intentionally or effectively alters her ability to make the
decision. 33 '
The Court next focused its attention on the undue burden
standard's application to each of the state regulations at issue in
Casey.3 3 2 First, the Justices upheld the statute's medical emergency definition. 3 3 The Justices ruled that the definition did not
work an undue burden because it adequately encompassed the
medical emergency exception mandated by Roe.33 4
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter next considered
and upheld the statute's informed consent section. 335 The Court
found a legitimate state interest in ensuring that a woman's aborFor a discussion of Akron's application of strict scrutiny, see supra notes 89-90 and
accompanying text.
327 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
328 Id. To support this view, the Court analogized abortion restrictions to constitutional ballot access limitations that hindered the fundamental right to vote. Id.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebreezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 788 n.9 (1983) (citing cases
which upheld reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions such as ballot access and
candidate eligibility limitations).
329 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819.
330 Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)).
331 Id. at 2820. The Justices clarified this standard by stating that "[w]hat is at
stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated
from all others in doing so." Id. Justice Scalia, however, admonished the joint
opinion by stating that "[d]efining an 'undue burden' as an 'undue hinderance' (or
a 'substantial obstacle') hardly 'clarifies' the test." Id. at 2877-78 (ScaliaJ., concurring and dissenting). The Justice opined that the undue burden standard was in
effect "standardless." Id. at 2878.
332 Id. at 2821-22.
333 Id.; see supra note 189 for text of the medical emergency definition. The Court
accepted the court of appeals's broad construction of the definition which included
all conditions that could pose a substantial health risk to the mother. Id.
334 Id. See supra note 190 for the court of appeals analysis of the necessity of such
exceptions.
335 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821-22; see supra note 197 for text of the informed consent section.
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tion choice was informed, and decided that providing women
with truthful, straightforward information relating to the abortion procedure was proper.3 3 6 The Justices further asserted
there was no evidence that requiring a doctor to provide women
with specific information either compromised the doctor/patient
relationship or erected
a substantial obstacle to the woman's
33 7
abortion decision.

The Court experienced difficulty in justifying its decision to
uphold the statute's mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period. 338 Although the Justices found a twenty-four hour waiting
period rationally aimed at allowing women to make a well-reasoned decision, the Court conceded that the restriction could
lead to much longer delays and higher costs for some women. 39
Nevertheless, the Justices concluded that the burden imposed by
the waiting period 34
was
not a substantial obstacle and did not in0
crease health risks.
The only section of the Pennsylvania abortion law that the
Court invalidated as an undue burden was the spousal notification provision. 34 ' The Justices examined the district court's detailed findings, which discussed the prevalence of domestic
violence in the United States. 342 Noting that the district court
specifically found a relationship between the notification of pregnancy and subsequent spousal abuse in some marriages, the
Court determined that many women would choose to forego an
336 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822-23. The Court overruled intimations in Akron v.

Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444 (1983) and Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762 (1986)
that forcing doctors to provide women with "truthful, nonmisleading information
about the nature of the [abortion] procedure, the attendant health risks and those
of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus" was unconstitutional.
Id. at 2833.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 2825.
339 Id.; see supra note 207 for discussion of possible ramifications for the twenty-

four hour waiting period requirement.
340 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26. The Court noted that the district court had not

utilized the undue burden standard to determine if the waiting period acted as a
substantial obstacle. Id. Therefore, the Court continued, the record was not suffi-

cient to conclude that the waiting period unduly burdened a woman's abortion
choice. Id. at 2826.
341 Id. at 2830. See supra note 219 for the text of the spousal notification section.
342 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2827. The district court record included findings that

domestic violence occurred in two-million United States families, women were unlikely to report spousal abuse for fear of retaliatory abuse, and many abused women
did not consider themselves to be battered or victims of sexual assaults by their
husbands. Id.
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abortion rather than choose to comply with spousal notification.
Such a situation, the Justices continued, would furnish
many husbands with an effective power to veto the wife's decision.3 44 Additionally, the Court refused to analogize spousal notification to constitutional parental notice laws because, the
Justices opined, a husband could not be given the same control
over his wife as a parent has over his or her child.3 45
Although the Court struck down the spousal notification requirement, the Justices upheld the section requiring unemancipated minors to receive parental consent for an abortion. 46 The
Justices adhered to precedent by holding that the section's judicial bypass procedure made it constitutional. 47
Finally, the Court validated all of the statute's recordkeeping
and reporting requirements, except the spousal notification reporting requirement. 48 In so doing, the Justices noted a strong
state interest in health care which would be furthered by the
compilation of information required by the provision.3 49 Fur-

thermore, the Court declared, the negligible increase in abortion
costs resulting from the requirements did not rise to the level of
an unduly burdensome obstacle. 5 0
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
agreed with the joint opinion's reaffirmation of Roe. 3 5 ' The Justice praised the Court's reliance on stare decisis and echoed the
3 52
contention that overruling Roe would have great societal costs.
343

Id. at 2828-29.

344 Id. at 2831.
345 Id. at 2830.

Id. at 2832; see supra note 211 for the text of the parental consent section.
Id. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972
(1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990); Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health Services, 462 U.S. 416, 440 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979).
348 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832. See supra note 237 for the text of the recordkeeping
and reporting requirements.
349 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832-33. The Court reaffirmed that recordkeeping and
reporting requirements "that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy are permissible." Id. at 2832 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 80 (1975)).
350 Id. at 2833 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court
asserted that there was a point where increased cost could constitute a substantial
obstacle. Id.
351 Id. at 2838 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens emphasized that "[t]he portions of the Court's opinion that I have joined
are more important than those with which I disagree." Id.
352 Id.
346
347
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Furthermore, the Justice concurred with the reiteration of Roe's
holding that post-viability abortions could be heavily regulated
and the Court's implicit reaffirmation that the mother's life and
health takes priority over prenatal life. 5 3
Justice Stevens, however, disagreed with the court's dismantling of the trimester framework crafted in Roe.3 54 In particular,
Justice Stevens implied that the Court had, in fact, overvalued the
state interest in protecting the unborn.3 5 5 The Justice reached
this conclusion by portraying the state interest as grounded in
"humanitarian and pragmatic concerns," not in the Constitution. 356 Conversely, Justice Stevens posited that the woman's liberty interest in abortion was protected by the Constitution
through Roe. s5 7 Thus, the Justice concluded that the state could
display a preference for childbirth over abortion but could not
use persuasive tactics to prejudice the woman's choice. 5 8
Utilizing this framework, the Justice analyzed the Pennsylvania Act's informed consent section. 5 9 Justice Stevens would
have invalidated the requirements forcing a woman's physician to
provide specific information regarding abortion alternatives, the
availability of medical assistance, and the father's responsibility
to provide child support.3 60 The Justice opined that these requirements were designed to dissuade women from having an
Id. at 2838-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra
note 325 and accompanying text for the court's reasoning for abandoning Roe's
trimester framework.
355 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2839 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
356 Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens asserted that these concerns were based on many citizens' moral view that
abortion is unacceptable and offensive. Id. The Justice continued, stating that
-[t]he State has a legitimate interest in minimizing such offense. The State may
also have a broader interest in expanding the population, believing society would
benefit from the services of additional productive citizens-or that the potential
human lives include the occasional Mozart or Curie." Id.
357 Id.
358 Id. The Justice opined that the State could display its preference for childbirth through funding, promoting family values, and erecting programs to provide
abortion alternatives. Id. at 2840-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Stevens cited Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760 (1986) and Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Services, 462 U.S. 416, 442-43 (1983), as examples of cases where information requirements designed to influence the abortion choice were invalidated.
Id. at 2841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
359 Id.; see supra note 197 for the text of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1983 &
Supp. 1991) (the informed consent section).
360 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2840.
353
354
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abortion.3 6 ' Justice Stevens voted to uphold the provision requiring doctors to provide information regarding the medical
risks of an abortion and carrying a baby to term as a neutral requirement similar to other medical procedures.362 Finally, the
Justice argued for the invalidation of the twenty-four hour waiting period because the Justice found this provision based on
erroneous assumptions regarding a woman's decisionmaking
capabilities.363

Justice Stevens next applied the joint opinion's undue burden standard to the Pennsylvania statute and again determined
that most of the informed consent section should have been
struck down.364 Depicting an undue burden as one that is too
severe or that lacks any rational justification, the Justice resolved
that the 24-hour waiting period was both severe and irrational.36 5
Similarly, Justice Stevens found no justification for the other in-

36 6 Jusformed consent provisions that he previously invalidated.

tice Stevens concluded by voting to strike down the parental
consent provision, and by concurring with the remainder of the
joint opinion.367
Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
praised the joint opinion's reaffirmation of Roe and defended the
trimester framework.3 68 TheJustice began by stating that all nonde minimis abortion restrictions should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 369 Justice Blackmun continued by declaring that
Id.
Id. In fact, Justice Stevens opined that such neutral requirements enhanced a
woman's decision. Id. at 4819 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
363 Id. at 2841-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Justice rejected the argument that the waiting period furthered the State interest in
potential life, reasoning that all obstacles imposed by the State would be held valid
if such an argument was accepted. Id. at 2841 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Stevens articulated, "[tlhe State cannot further its interests by simply wearing down the ability of the pregnant woman to exercise her
constitutional right." Id.
364 Id. at 2842-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
365 Id. at 2843 (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Justice
reached this conclusion by relying on the district court's finding that the waiting
period would cause long delays and increase costs for some women seeking an
abortion. Id. Justice Stevens found no legitimate purpose for imposing such a restriction, reiterating that the restriction was based on erroneous assumptions about
women's decision-making capabilities. Id.
366 Id.
367 Id. Justice Stevens did not articulate his reasoning for disagreeing with the
informed consent section.
368 Id. at 2844, 2847-48 (Blackmun,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
369 Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
361
362
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Roe's trimester framework best satisfied strict scrutiny analysis.3 7 °
The Justice restated Roe's mandate that the state's interest in the
fetus began at viability while its interest in the health of the
mother began at the end of the first trimester.3 7 ' Positing that
the trimester framework's factual underpinnings had not been
undermined, the Justice asserted that the trimester approach was
less malleable than the joint opinion's undue burden standard.3 7 2
Observing other cases adopting similar, nontextual methods for
analyzing constitutional rights, Justice Blackmun rejected arguments that the trimester framework was infirm because it was not
enumerated in the Constitution's text and because it resembled a
code rather than constitutional doctrine.3 7 3
The Justice also countered the Court's assertion that Roe
failed to value the state's interest in potential human life
throughout a woman's pregnancy.3 7 4 Recognizing the state's
legitimate interest in the fetus from the moment of conception,
Justice Blackmun submitted that only a compelling interest could
pass strict scrutiny. 5 The Justice reiterated that viability
marked the point at which the state's interest became compelling,3 76 and agreed with Justice Stevens's view that the state
could not attempt to persuade or coerce a woman's abortion
decision.3 7 7
Applying strict scrutiny analysis, Justice Blackmun voted to
Blackmun asserted that the Court had reaffirmed fundamental rights of bodily integrity and personal privacy which had traditionally been subjected to strict scrutiny. Id.
370 Id.

371 Id. at 2847 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
372 Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
373 Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1951)).
374 Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
note 325 and accompanying text for the Justices' reasoning for abandoning Roe's
trimester framework.
375 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
376 Id. Justice Blackmun wrote:
The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal development; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot
survive separate from the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests distinct from, or
paramount to, those of the pregnant woman.
Id. (quoting Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 553-54
(1989)).
377 Id.
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strike down all of the statute's challenged provisions. 3s7 The Justice characterized the informed consent provisions as inflexible
imperatives designed to discourage a woman's abortion
choice.3 79 Furthermore, the Justice accepted the district court
finding that the burdens imposed by the twenty-four hour waiting
period were notjustified.3 s a Similarly, Justice Blackmun said that
the parental consent requirements were overly burdensome.3 8 '
Finally, the Justice disagreed with the statute's reporting requirements because Justice Blackmun feared that physicians, knowing
their names would appear on state reports, might refuse to refer
women to abortion clinics.3 8 2
The Justice concluded the opinion with an unbridled attack
on ChiefJustice Rehnquist. s83 Justice Blackmun admonished the
Chief Justice for failing to recognize a general right of privacy in
the Constitution, and expressed concern that Roe could be overturned in the future. 8 4
Id. at 2850 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.; see supra note 197 for text of the informed consent section. Specifically,
the Justice objected to the prohibition against counselors providing the mandated
information, and opposed the information's content. Id.
380 Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra
notes 18-28 and accompanying text for the district court's findings.
381 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Relying on the district court's contention that the provision would require an
in-person visit to the abortion facility by the parent, Justice Blackmun opined that
such a requirement could lead to substantial delays for the minor seeking an abortion. Id.
382 Id. Justice Blackmun asserted that despite the confidentiality of such reports,
many physicians might fear that they could be the victims of harassment for referring women to abortion clinics. Id. Furthermore, the Justice declared that Pennsylvania had not shown a sufficient reason for requiring the naming of physicians
on state reports. Id.
383 Id. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Justice wrote:
THE CHIEFJUSTICE's criticism of Roe follows from his stunted conception of individual liberty. While recognizing that the Due Process
Clause protects more than simple physical liberty, he then goes on to
construe this Court's personal-liberty cases as establishing only a
laundry list of particular rights, rather than a principled account of
how these particular rights are grounded in a more general right of
privacy.
Id.
384 Id. at 2854 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Blackmun closed the opinion by stating:
In one sense, the Court's approach is worlds apart from that of THE
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA. And yet, in another sense,
the distance between the two approaches is short-the distance is but
a single vote.
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and
378

379
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ChiefJustice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White, Scalia and
Thomas, concurred in part and dissented in part, and called for
Roe's overturn while attacking the joint opinion's undue burden
standard.38 5 Noting that Casey was the fourth consecutive abor36
tion case in which the Court was unable to attain a majority,
the Chief Justice stated that the confusion and uncertainty
spawned by the Court's abortion jurisprudence necessitated a reexamination of Roe.38 7
The Chief Justice began this reexamination, stating that the
Court had deemed rights fundamental if they were necessary to
ordered liberty 388 or were strongly rooted in the country's tradi-

tions. 3 9 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, abortion failed
both tests. 390 First, the Chief Justice refused to find an overall
right of privacy arising out of cases protecting the right to marry,
procreate, and use contraception.3 9 ' The Chief Justice opined

that the abortion question was unique because, unlike other privacy-related cases, abortion involved the destruction of potential
human life.392 Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated,
393
abortion was not an essential component of ordered liberty.
Second, Chief Justice Rehnquist examined the history of
abortion laws in the United States to determine if abortion was a
when I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor well
may focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly
where the choice between the two worlds will be made.
Id. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
385 Id. 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
ChiefJustice called the undue burden standard "an unjustified constitutional compromise, one which leaves the Court in a position to closely scrutinize all types of
abortion regulations despite the fact that it lacks the power to do so under the
Constitution." Id. at 2855-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
386 Id. at 2858 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. 490 (1989)).
387 Id. at 2858 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
388 Id. at 2858-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
389 Id. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
390 Id.
391 Id. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (protection of right to use
contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (protection of the right to
marry); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (protection of right to procreate).
392 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)).
393 Id.
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fundamental right rooted in the country's traditions.3 94 Noting
the prevalence of laws banning and restricting abortions at the
time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, and for many
years before and thereafter, the Chief Justice reasoned that the
right to an abortion was not rooted in the country's history. 95
Concluding that abortion was not a fundamental right, the Chief
Justice stressed that creating fundamental rights not expressed in
the Constitution's language or design compromised the Court's
legitimacy. 96
Chief Justice Rehnquist next questioned the Court's stare decisis analysis. 3 9 7 The ChiefJustice found a paradox in the Court's
reaffirmation of Roe and the discarding of the trimester approach
upon which the case was based.3

98

Terming the joint opinion a

revision of Roe rather than a reaffirmation, Chief Justice Rehnquist charged Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter with misapplying stare decisis principles.3 99 Specifically, the Chief Justice
found unpersuasive the argument that Roe's factual underpinnings had remained unchanged. 40 0 The ChiefJustice argued that

because Roe's legal principles were unfounded, it was irrelevant
that the decision's viability standard had not been transformed.40 ' Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist attacked the joint
Id.
Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that English common law had proscribed
abortion after "quickening," and that twenty-eight of the forty-five states and territories in 1868, the year of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, had laws prohibiting or restricting abortions. Id. The ChiefJustice further noted that twenty-one of
those states still had the same abortion laws in effect when Roe was decided in 1973.
Id.
396 Id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Chief Justice buttressed this view by relying on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), which stated: "The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id. (quoting Bowers, 478
U.S. at 194.).
397 Id. The Chief Justice chastised the joint opinion for relying on stare decisis
rather than stating whether Roe had been correctly decided. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist also charged the joint opinion with rejecting Roe's finding of abortion as a
fundamental right necessitating strict judicial scrutiny. Id.
394
395

398

Id.

Id. at 2860-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that "authentic principles of stare decisis do not require that any portion of the reasoning in Roe be kept intact. 'Stare decisis is not...
a universal, inexorable command,' especially in cases involving the interpretation of
the Federal Constitution." Id. at 2861 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
399

400
401

Id.

Id.
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opinion's reliance argument, rationalizing that no reliance had
been proven.4 °2
The Chief Justice next stated that the Court's contention
that Roe should be upheld to preserve the Court's legitimacy, was
unfounded.40 3 Expressing concern about Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter's decision to give highly controversial cases
heightened precedential weight, Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned how the Court would determine whether a case was sufficiently controversial to receive this special protection. 4° Taken
to its logical conclusion, the Chief Justice submitted, the joint
opinion's stare decisis analysis would allow public perception to
play a role in Court decisions, thus weakening the Court's legitimacy as an institution unmoved by external pressures.40 5
ChiefJustice Rehnquist also rejected the Court's undue burden standard as lacking a constitutional basis. 40 6 Although disagreeing with Roe's trimester framework, the Chief Justice
opined that the trimester approach did, at least, adhere to the
constitutional principle that fundamental rights must be strictly
scrutinized. 40 7 Declaring that the undue burden standard did not
402 Id. at 2862 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
ChiefJustice attacked the joint opinion's assertion that Roe had made it possible for
women to be equal participants in society, stating that women's economic and social advances had been the product of their own efforts and society's acceptance of
them in new roles. Id. Furthermore, ChiefJustice Rehnquist continued, reproductive planning could remedy any reliance by taking immediate action if Roe were
overturned. Id. The ChiefJustice did not expound, however, on what type of action
could be taken. Id.
403 Id.
404 Id. at 2863 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief
Justice Rehnquist opined that the Court was not in a good position to determine
how a particular issue is perceived by the country because the Court is supposed to
ignore public opinion. Id.
405 Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
ChiefJustice expressed consternation over the Court's use of Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as examples of
why the Court should not overrule Roe. Id. at 2864 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that by overruling Lochner and Plessy, the Court had increased its "stature." Id. Asserting that Lochner and
Plessy were overruled because their legal principles were erroneous and not as the
result of new understandings of previously misunderstood facts, the Chief Justice
questioned why Roe should not, similarly, be overruled. Id. at 2864-65 (Rehnquist,
CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore the Chief Justice
stated: "The Judicial Branch derives its legitimacy not from following public opinion, but from deciding by its best lights whether legislative enactments of the popular branches of Government comport with the Constitution." Id. at 2865
(Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
406 Id. at 2866 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
407 Id.
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subject abortion regulations to strict scrutiny, the Chief Justice
questioned the standard's application in this area.408 Chief Justice Rehnquist also expressed that the undue burden standard
would be arbitrary in its application, depending on courts' subjective views of what a substantial obstacle entailed.4 °9
Stating that abortion regulations should be determined by
the state legislatures, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the
Court should recognize abortion as a liberty interest protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, rather than a
fundamental right. 4 10 As a result, the Chief Justice continued,

the Court should utilize a rational basis approach in testing abortion regulations. 4
Beginning this rational basis analysis of the Pennsylvania
statute, ChiefJustice Rehnquist voted to uphold the provisions of
the informed consent section.4" 2 Positing that ensuring an informed abortion decision and the preservation of unborn life
were legitimate state interests, the Chief Justice ascertained that
the required information was rationally related to these interests.4 13 Chief Justice Rehnquist also upheld the section's twentyfour hour waiting period, characterizing it as a reasonable re408 Id. Referring to the undue burden test ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated: "It is a
standard which even today does not command the support of a majority of this
Court. And it will not, we believe, result in the sort of 'simple limitation,' easily
applied, which the joint opinion anticipates. In sum, it is a standard which is not
built to last." Id.
409 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist reinforced this theory by noting that the authors
of the joint opinion andJustice Stevens, both applying the undue burden test, had
reached different results with regard to the Pennsylvania statute's informed consent
section. Id. See supra notes 335-37 and 364-66 and accompanying text for the joint
opinion's and Justice Stevens's undue burden analysis of the informed consent
requirements.
410 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2867. (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
411 Id. Rational basis review allows a statute to be upheld if the law is "rationally
related to a legitimate state interest." Id. (citation omitted).
412 Id. See supra note 197 for text of the informed consent section.
413 Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist opined that requiring the imparting of information pertaining to abortion procedures and risks was "clearly related to maternal
health and to the State's legitimate purpose in requiring informed consent." Id.
(quoting Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 446
(1983)). The ChiefJustice also found a state interest in the fetus which was rationally related to provisions requiring a woman to be apprised of the fetus' gestational
age and the risks of childbirth. Id. (citing Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 445-46 n.37 (1983)). Agreeing with the court of appeals that
states can decide that a physician is the best qualified person to give the woman this
information, the ChiefJustice discounted arguments that counselors should be able
to provide the required information as well. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 704 (3d Cir. 1991)). ChiefJustice Rehnquist also found dis-
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quirement furthering the state interest in promoting a carefully
considered decision by the mother.4 " 4
The Chief Justice also maintained that the parental consent
requirements were constitutional.4 " 5 Buttressing this contention
by citing numerous cases upholding similar provisions,4 1 6 the
ChiefJustice asserted that a state had a strong interest in protecting minors.41 7 This interest, Chief Justice Rehnquist continued,
was rationally furthered by parental consent requirements
designed to give parents an opportunity to assist their children in
making a responsible decision.41 8
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the Court's decision
to strike down the statute's spousal notification section, noting
the provision's numerous exceptions.41 9 Opining that a provision should be upheld against a facial challenge unless it is
proven unconstitutional under all circumstances, 420 the Chief
Justice rejected the Court's contention that the section should be
invalidated because it could effectively deny some women an
abortion. 4 2 ' The Chief Justice submitted that the state interest in

protecting the fetus and promoting marital integrity, and the
husband's interest in the fetus, were rationally related to the noti422
fication requirement.
Continuing a rational basis analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist
voted to uphold the statute's reporting requirements and medical
positive the fact that the required information was not false or misleading. Id. at
2868 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
414 Id. The ChiefJustice noted that the waiting period and information requirements would be waived in the case of a medical emergency. Id.
415 Id.
416 Id. at 2869 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476
(1983); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)).
417 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that the State undoubtedly " 'has a strong
and legitimate interest in the welfare of its young citizens, whose immaturity, inexperience, and lack ofjudgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their
rights wisely.'" Id. (quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990)).
418 Id. (quoting Ohio v. Akron CenterforReproductive Health, 497 U.S. at 520 (1990)).
419 Id. at 2869-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
supra note 219 for text of spousal notification section.
420 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2870 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
421 Id. The ChiefJustice posited that an abortion restriction should not be struck
down simply because it could deny women the right to choose in some "worst case"
scenarios. Id. (citing Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. at
514).
422 Id. at 2871 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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emergency exception. 423 The Chief Justice found the reporting
requirement to be rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in increasing medical knowledge in the maternal health
field.4 24 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the Third
Circuit's interpretation of the medical emergency exception and
4 25
the joint opinion's decision to uphold it.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, and Justice Thomas, concurred in part and dissented in
part, and reiterated much of the ChiefJustice's analysis by urging
the Court to return the abortion question to the states.4 26 Opining that abortion was not a constitutionally protected liberty, the
Justice defended this view by stating that the Constitution did not
address abortion and the country's traditions had allowed abortion to be prohibited by state legislatures. 7
Declaring the entire Pennsylvania statute constitutional,
Justice Scalia attacked numerous assertions made in the joint
opinion.4 28 First, Justice Scalia took exception with Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter's assertion that the Court's reasoned judgment should suffice when adjudicating substantive
due process claims. 4 29 The Justice opined that this approach
would lead courts to utilize subjective viewpoints in adjudicating
such issues rather than constitutional interpretations.450 Chastising the Court for not stating whether Roe was a correct application of "reasoned judgment," Justice Scalia asserted that Roe was
wrongly decided.4 3 '
423 Id. at 2872 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
supra notes 189, 237 for texts of the recordkeeping and reporting requirements and
the medical emergency definition.
424 Id.
425 Id. at 2873 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
426 Id. (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia opined:
The States may, if they wish, permit abortion-on-demand, but the
Constitution does not require them to do so. The permissibility of
abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade
one another and then voting.
Id.
427 Id. Justice Scalia compared the abortion question to laws outlawing bigamy.
Id. at 2874 (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Justice stated
that bigamy laws intrude upon people's liberty to marry whom they choose, but
bigamy has not been regarded as a fundamental right because the Constitution has
not enumerated it and bigamy is not part of the country's traditions. Id.
428 Id. at 2875-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
429 Id. at 2875.
430 Id.

431

Id.
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Justice Scalia next challenged the Court's assertion that
overruling Roe would create a "jurisprudence of doubt."4 ' The
Justice asserted that the undue burden standard would create
more doubt in the abortion arena because courts would have different opinions about what constituted an undue burden.4 33 Furthermore, Justice Scalia charged the Court with manufacturing
the test by taking phrases from previous abortion decisions out of
context.434 Specifically, Justice Scalia admonished Justice
O'Connor for softening the undue burden analysis that the Justice had previously advocated.43 5
Reiterating much of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, Justice Scalia finished the dictum-filled analysis by asserting that the
Court's abortion jurisprudence had been disruptive to the country, and by attacking the joint opinion's stare decisis analysis.43 6
Justice Scalia concluded with an impassioned plea to the Court to
return the abortion question to the states.4 3 7
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey is the Supreme Court's most re432

Id. at 2876 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

433 Id. Justice Scalia stated, "to come across this phrase ['Liberty finds no refuge

in a jurisprudence of doubt'] in the joint opinion-which calls upon federal district
judges to apply an 'undue burden' standard as doubtful in application as it is unprincipled in origin-is really more than one should have to bear." Id.
434 Id. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
opined that Justice Blackmun's use of the phrase "undue burden" in Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) was not intended to be utilized as the basis of a
constitutional standard. Id. at 2876 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
435 Id. Justice Scalia noted, among other alleged inconsistencies, that while in
Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc., Justice O'Connor had defined undue burdens as "absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision,"
the joint opinion had cushioned this language in Casey by terming an undue burden
as a "substantial" obstacle. Id. (quoting Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 464 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). Similarly, Justice Scalia pointed out that Justice O'Connor had previously opined that "the State
possesses compelling interests in the protection of potential human life .. throughout pregnancy" which had been downgraded to "substantial" or "profound" interests by the Casey opinion. Id. at 2879 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (quoting Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health Inc., 462 U.S. at 461)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
436 Id. at 2881-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
437 Id. at 2885 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
expounded:
[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue
arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all
participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an
honest fight, by continuing the imposition of a rigid national rule instead of allowing for regional differences, the Court merely prolongs
and intensifies the anguish.
We should get out of this area, where we have no right to be, and
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cent attempt to clarify the boundaries of the abortion issue. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter sought to clarify the
ambiguities left by Webster and its progeny, while emphasizing
that the essential holding of Roe v. Wade would remain intact. 438
The Court's attempt to craft a decisive ruling, however, merely
demonstrated more indecision and created greater ambiguity, as
evidenced by the Court's five separate opinions. Moreover, the
Court's endeavor to reach a compromise between pro-life and
pro-choice positions, by reaffirming Roe while permitting restrictive abortion regulations, has left both sides dissatisfied 43 9 and
has resulted in an opinion laden with contradictions.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, the Court's pretense of
adhering to stare decisis was merely an illusion. 440 The joint opinion's veiled language and manipulated constitutional analysis effectively overruled Roe because an essential element of the Roe
decision was a mandate that abortion was a fundamental right to
be analyzed by strict scrutiny. Moreover, the Court effectively
overruled cases following Roe, such as Akron and Thornburgh, because these cases used strict scrutiny to strike down many of the
same provisions that the Casey Court upheld under the undue
burden standard.
In abandoning the strict scrutiny test for the undue burden
standard, 44 1 the Court again created only an illusion of adherence to precedent. As Justice Scalia recognized, the Court softened the definition of an undue burden from the definition
I all
l of Justice
employed in previous abortion cases. 442 In
O'Connor's former opinions discussing this standard, the Justice
defined the standard as an "absolute obstacle or severe limitation
on the abortion right.

'4 4 3

The Casey decision, however, changed

this analysis by defining an undue burden as "a substantial obstawhere we do neither ourselves nor the country any good by
remaining.
Id.

Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2084.
439 Marie Adrine, Abortion Ruling Has Limited Impact in New Jersey, NJ LAWYER, July
6, 1992, at 1.
440 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The ChiefJustice observed that "Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a
storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality." Id.
441 See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the undue
burden test.
442 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
443 Akron v.Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 464 (1983)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
438
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cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus." 4'4 4
This language, on its face, suggests that the Court would
strike down abortion restrictions more liberally than under previous formulations of the undue burden test, because of the shift
from "absolute" obstacles to "substantial" obstacles. This shift,
however, is illusory, because the new approach is applied to any
woman seeking to abort a nonviable fetus. Thus, in reality, the
Pennsylvania abortion regulations are as restrictive as any previously upheld, and they display the unworkability of the standard.
Pennsylvania's abortion regulations have been referred to as "the
strictest in the country, ' 4 4 5 yet the Court upheld all but one of
the provisions, finding no substantial burdens present. Furthermore, the subjective character of the standard was exemplified by
the fact that Justice Stevens would have invalidated the parental
and informed consent provisions as working an undue burden
while the Court did not. These factors demonstrate the easy manipulation of the undue burden standard. If the Supreme Court
has proven to be inconsistent in applying the standard, how are
the lower courts to apply the test in a consistent manner?
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion aptly recognized that the
44 6
creation of a substantial obstacle is largely a matter of opinion.
The Chief Justice noted that the Court resorted to the particular
views of the Justices in upholding the twenty-four hour waiting
period because this restriction failed to create a substantial burden on the abortion decision.4 4 7 Conversely, the joint opinion's
authors struck down the twenty-four hour waiting period despite
findings by the district court that such a requirement would result in increased costs and risks of delay in abortions. 448 TheJustices recognized that this provision would create a burden, but
reasoned that "[a] particular burden is not of necessity a substan4 49
tial obstacle.
The Court, however, did defer to the findings of the district
court on the spousal notice provision to determine that it created
an undue burden. 45" The Justices recognized that this provision
would only affect a very narrow group of women, but asserted
444

Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.

445 Axelrod, supra note 7, at 691.
446 Id. at 2867 (Rehnquist,
447 Id.
448 Planned Parenthood v.
449
450

C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
Id. at 2827.

1992]

NOTE

that "[t]he analysis does not end with the one percent of women
upon whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is
measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on
those whose conduct it affects."I45 While this maxim worked well
to invalidate the spousal notice provision, the Court clearly discarded it with regard to the twenty-four hour waiting period provision. The authors of the joint opinion failed to consider those
women who are indigent or who have to travel great distances to
obtain abortions, those upon whom this regulation will fall most
heavily. Clearly the twenty-four hour waiting period will prove to
be a significant burden on these women.
Judge Alito's dissent in the Third Circuit's opinion in Casey
exemplified the inconsistency of the Supreme Court's decision.
Judge Alito carefully outlined Justice O'Connor's prior abortion
decisions in an attempt to discern the correct application of the
undue burden standard.452 The judge stated that Justice
O'Connor had consistently held that no undue burden was created by regulations which caused only some women to be less
likely to choose an abortion.453 Utilizing this determination,
Judge Alito concluded that the spousal notice provision should
be upheld, since it only affected a very small percentage of women.454 Thus, the Court's decision both is inconsistent with the
Court's application of the undue burden standard and departs
from Justice O'Connor's former interpretations. The undue burden standard has become a parody of itself, as the Justices have
used it to strike down or uphold provisions at whim, based on
individual, subjective interpretations. This inconsistency only
heightens the already pervasive confusion surrounding the abortion issue, and leaves no clear standard for lower courts to
follow.
Despite the Court's assertions to the contrary, Roe has been
dead since Webster. Although the Justices claimed to endorse the
central holding of Roe, nothing is more central to the Roe decision than its mandate that abortion is a fundamental right. By
employing the undue burden standard, the Supreme Court, in an
attempt to take the middle ground, has fabricated a new yardstick
451 Id. at 2829.

452 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 719-27, aft'd, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992) (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
453 Id. at 720-21. (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
454 Id. at 722-23 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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by which to analyze state abortion restrictions. The problem with
such a compromise is two-fold: first, the Court has done precisely what the Justices purportedly sought to avoid-created a
"jurisprudence of doubt;"4 '55 second, the Court has given more
ammunition to the Justices who oppose Roe because those Justices can now attack the premise that abortion should receive
special protection, and also question the manner in which it is
tested.45 6
Decisive guidelines are needed to determine how far a woman's liberty interest in abortion may extend without interfering
with the potential life of the fetus. If abortion is to continue as a
constitutionally protected right, a return to the strict scrutiny test
is warranted to attain consistency, because it best prevents ambiguity and manipulation. The Casey decision, however, has left the
abortion issue in limbo, with American citizens powerless to act
as nine Justices sit poised to shift the guidelines again when the
next abortion case reaches the Supreme Court.
Mary Edwards*
Brian D. Lee
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2878.
Chief Rehnquist displayed this fact by stating, "[w]hile we disagree with [the
strict scrutiny standard], it at least had a recognized basis in constitutional law at
the time Roe was decided. The same cannot be said for the 'undue burden' standard, which is created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the joint opinion." Id. at 2866 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
* The views expressed in the conclusion are solely those of Mary Edwards.
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